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JBORDINATED DEBT: A CAPITAL MARKETS
APPROACH TO BANK REGULATION
MARX E. VAN DER WEIDE*
SATISH M. KINI* *
Abstract: Banking organizations in the United States are growing larger;
more complex and more diversified in their operations. As a result, bank
regulators are becoming less able to understand and supervise their regula-
tory charges. The recently enacted Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act contributed to
this trend by expanding the activities in which banks and their affiliates
may engage. The authors argue that increasing the amount of market dis-
cipline to which banks are subject promises to remedy many of the shortcom-
ings of government supervision and regulation. This Article proposes that
large banks should be required to issue a minimum amount of long-term
subordinated debt to third-party investors and sets forth a comprehensive
subordinated debt program as a complement to government regulation of
banks. Actual and prospective holders of bank subordinated debt will con-
strain bank risk taking roughly in accordance with the interests of the fed-
eral government and without the bureaucratic and other inefficiencies en-
. tailed in government regulation. Holders of bank subordinated debt, as they
buy and sell bank debt securities in the secondary market and negotiate
purchases in the primary market, will also signal to federal regulators the
private sector's view as to the value of a bank's enterprise.
INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the most significant U.S. banking legislation
in over sixty-five years.' The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act eliminates many
long-standing federal and state law barriers to affiliations between
banks and securities firms, insurance companies, mutual funds, and
* BA., University of Iowa, 1992; J.D., Yale Law School, 1995. Mr. Van Der Weide is a
senior attorney in the Legal Division of the Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C.
** BA., Colgate University, 1985; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1992. Mr.
Kini is a counsel at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Washington, D.C. The authors would like
to thank Michael Helfer for his comments. The opinions expressed in this Article are ex-
clusively those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of Wilmer, Cutler & Picker-
ing or the Federal Reserve Board and its staff.
1 See Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and elsewhere).
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other financial service providers. hi so doing, the Act paves the way
for a significant restructuring of the U.S. financial services industry
and a modernization of the way financial services are offered in the
United States. Tucked comfortably in the middle of Title I of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is a provision that instructs the Federal Re-
serve Board and the 'Treasury Department to study the feasibility of
requiring large banks and their holding companies to maintain a por-
tion of their capital in the form of subordinated debt. 2 This require-
ment is a way to bring market forces to bear on the operation of bank-
ing institutions and to reduce the risks that these institutions and
their expanded activities may pose to the federal deposit insurance
fund.3
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's commission of a federal study of
subordinated debt is the latest in a long series of calls from academics,
regulators, and public officials for investigation into the potential
benefits that market discipline—that is, using the private sector to .
monitor and regulate bank risk taking—may provide to the U.S. sYs-
tem of bank regulation.'[ Since the 1980s, the academic literature has
contained various proposals for using different forms of market disci-
pline to supervise and regulate banking activities, and academic writ-
ers have suggested alternatively that depositors, nondeposit creditors
and shareholders are the market participants best situated to monitor
and regulate bank behavior.3
 Several commentators have argued that
2
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 108.
$ See id. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defines subordinated debt to mean unsecured
debt that:
(A) has an original weighted average maturity of not less than 5 years; (B) is
subordinated as to payment of principal and interest to all other indebted-
ness of the bank, including deposits; (C) is not supported by any form of
credit enhancement, including a guarantee or standby letter of credit; and
(D) is not held in whole or in part by any affiliate [of the batik].
See id. § 108 (c) (3).
4 For example, only a few months prior to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence Meyer gave a speech in which he advocated an
examination of using marketplace discipline to complement existing bank supervision and
regulation. See Fed. Res. Gov. Laurence H. Meyer, Remarks at Conference on Reforming
Bank Capital Standards (June 14, 1999) (available at The Federal Reserve Board, Federal
Reserve Board Speech from 06/14/99 (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http://wwwlederalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990614.htm>) [hereinafter Meyer, Conf. on Reform].
5 See, e.g., Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too Much?,
16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 311, 331-32 (1997) (suggesting shareholders as source of market
discipline); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L REV. 31, 55-58 (1991) (discussing "double
liability" of shareholders as means of encouraging shareholder discipline) [hereinafter
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subordinated debtholders are the preferred source of market disci-
pline.6
The use of market discipline, however, has not been without crit-
ics. Indeed, some commentators have contended that proponents of
market discipline have not presented workable models that can
achieve the goal of monitoring and curbing bank risk-taking activi-
ties.7 Other commentators have argued that, among potential market
disciplinarians, subordinated debtholders are ill-suited to serve as
monitors of bank behavior. 8
In light of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's demand for a study of
subordinated debt and in anticipation of the new financial world to
be ushered in by the Act, this Article takes a fresh look at the market
discipline debate. In this new era, in which banks and bank holding
companies will be permitted to engage in a wide array of financial
activities, the regulatory system will need to utilize market forces to
help monitor the activities of banking firms. In short, banking organi-
zations are becoming more complicated, and the government will
need help in supervising these increasingly complex and geographi-
cally diverse institutions.
This Article concludes that a properly structured subordinated
debt program can serve as an important source for constraining bank
behavior and can complement federal and state supervision and ex-
amination efforts. 9 This Article formulates a properly structured sub-
Macey & Millet; Double Liability]; Krishna G. Mantripragada, Depositors as a Source of Market
Discipline, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 543, 552-54 (1992) (suggesting depositors as a source for
monitoring and disciplining bank conduct); David G. Oedel, Private Intabank Discipline, 16
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POO( 327, 402-05(1993) (exploring interbank transactions as source of
market discipline).
6 See Douglas D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources of Market Discipline, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 347,
358-60 (1993); Gary Gorton & Anthony M. Santomero, Market Discipline and Bank Subordi-
nated Debt, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 119, 127 (1990); Larry D. Wall. A Plan for Re-
ducing Future Deposit Insurance Losses: Puttable Subordinated Debt, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA
ECON. REV., Aug. 1989, at 2; see also Meyer, Conf. on Reform, supra note 4 (noting that
requiring banks to issue subordinated debt is "a particularly attractive means" for provid-
ing increased market discipline).
7 See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 Otuo ST. U. 1159, 1161 &n.1
(1989) [hereinafter Gallen, What Price Bank Failuren; Helen A. Garten, Still Banking on the
Market.: A Comment on the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 241-42 (1988)
[hereinafter Garten, Still Banking on the Market].
See, e.g., COUVill, supra note 5, at 322-23.
g This Article refers consistently to "banks" as a short form for all federally insured de-
pository institutions, whether organized as national or state banks or federal or state-
chartered savings associations. indeed, with regard to the requirements of the subordi-
nated debt program proposed in this Article, there is no reason why one class of deposi-
tory institutions (banks) should be treated differently from another (savings associations).
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ordinated debt program, which program we believe to be the most
detailed and workable proposal to-date for the issuance of subordi-
nated debt by banks. In reaching this conclusion, this Article also
evaluates the arguments made by both opponents of market discipline
and proponents of forms of market discipline other than subordi-
nated debt.
The first Part of this Article examines a predicate question: What
is it about banks that causes the government to regulate and supervise
them and makes us carefully consider alternative methods of supervi-
sion and regulation? N.rt II looks at the current approaches to bank-
ing regulation and supervision and highlights the significant limita-
tions of these approaches. Part III examines the ways in which market
discipline may complement existing bank examination and supervi-
sion, and it assesses alternative sources of market discipline. Part IV
contains our detailed proposal for using subordinated debt as the
source of market discipline. Part V lays out some of the benefits of
using subordinated debt, especially in light of the financial reforms
brought about by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Finally, Part VI re-
sponds to the concerns and questions raised by commentators about
market discipline in general and subordinated debt in particular.
I. WHY Do WE NEED TO REGULATE BANKS?
Despite two decades of deregulation, banks remain subject to a
uniquely complex and intrusive regulatory scheme, one that makes
banking one of the most comprehensively regulated industries in the
American economy. 10
 For example, federal law restricts the ownership
of banking organizations," places limits on the activities and invest-
The business of banks and thrifts, although historically different, is today quite similar and
the failure of both types of institutions gives use to largely the same systemic risks and ex-
poses the federal safety net to the same potential liability. See, e.g., Ira L. Tannenbaum, The
Unitary Thrift Holding Company and the Thrift Charter after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, BANK-
ING POLY REP., Dec. 20, 1999, at 13-15.
10
 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides et al., The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and
Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks, 39 J. L. &
ECON. 667, 668 (1996); Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 303-04 (1987); Helen A. Gallen, Regulatory Growing Pains:
Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORD HAM L. REV. 501, 506 (1989)
[hereinafter Garten, Regulatory Gaming Pains].
n See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) & 1842(a) (1994) (providing
that no individual, group of individuals or company may acquire control of a bank or bank
holding company unless the acquisition has been approved by federal regulators). Federal
regulators typically examine such factors as the competence, experience and financial
ability of the potential acquirer. See id. In addition, until recently, federal law barred banks
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ments of banking organizations12 and requires banking organizations
to maintain certain prescribed levels of capita1. 13 Before examining
the potential benefits of increasing the amount of market discipline
to which banks are subject, it is necessary to answer a predicate ques-
tion: Why do we regulate and supervise banks? Or to be more precise,
why do we employ a regulatory strategy in banking that is so different
front the approach used in supervising othër firms and even other
financial intermediaries? 14
Ultimately, the answer is that we subject banks to unique levels of
regulatory scrutiny and supervision in order to prevent—or, more
accurately, to minimize the potential adverse effects of—bank fail-
ures." Firm failure is, of course, in no respect unique to banking. In
fact, in the context of other industries and the economy as a whole,
from being affiliated with companies principally engaged in the underwriting and dealing
of securities. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994). The restrictions on the affiliation of banks and
securities underwriters and dealers have been relaxed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act;
however, the Act maintains the separation between banks and commercial firms. See Ken-
neth A. Guenther,- The Walls Tumble—.Except One. 49 1NDEP. BANKER 20, 31 (Dec. 1, 1999);
Dean Anason, Senate Passes Reform Bill; Gramm Calls For a Sequel, Am. BANKER, Nov. 5. 1999,
at 1.
12 See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (7) (Stipp. II 1996) (national banks may engage only in the "busi-
ness of banking" and may engage only in limited underwriting and dealing of securities);
12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (bank holding companies may not engage in
commercial activities).
" Banks and bank holding companies must comply with two basic types of capital re-
quirements: risk-based capital ratios and leverage ratios. For a description of these re-
quirements, see, e.g., MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS ACTIVI-
TIES OF BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 318-27 (1993).
14 Financial intermediaries, as a whole, have been regulated differently than industrial
companies. Traditionally, the regulation of industrial corporations has been directed prin-
cipally at ensuring full disclosure of relevant information to investors, while the regulation
of financial intermediaries also has sought to limit the risks of investing in those compa-
nies. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial IntermediaHes, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 3
(1976). More recently, that regulatory strategy has begun to change and, at least to sonic
degree, financial institutions have generally begun to be treated more like their non-
financial counterparts. See Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains, supra note 10, at 504-06; see
also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 101-161, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341-84 (1999) (permitting
affiliations between and among banks, insurers, securities firms, mutual funds and other
financial intermedia•ies).
15
 There are other explanations for why banking institutions historically have been
subject to a unique regulatory treatment. For example, Professor Oedel notes that concen-
tration of banking power has been a concern since the days of the framers. David G.
Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Apposes, 67 U. Cow. L. REV. 477, 542-46
(1996) [hereinafter Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law]. Although these explanations for bank-
ing regulation offer an important historic or political perspective, they do not adequately
explain why, in today's financial services industry, banks should be treated differently from
other financial service purveyors.
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the failure of firms generally is regarded as healthy and beneficial.
Failure serves the useful cleansing function of eliminating misman-
aged, noncompetitive and obsolete institutions, and diverting their
resources to enterprises that can more efficiently utilize them. 16 Bank
failures, however, have been and currently are viewed differently be-
cause: (1) banks are uniquely susceptible to failure, and even banks
that are well managed face unpredictable risks of sudden failure; (2)
individual bank failures may pose significant systemic risks to other
banks, other segments of the economy, and to the economy as a
whole; and (3) under the current system of federal government guar-
antees, which were designed to mitigate the individual and systemic
risks of bank failure, the direct cost of bank failures may fall not
merely on the institutions that fail but also on all federal taxpayers.
A. Susceptibility to Failure
Banks have capital structures that make them uniquely suscepti-
ble to failure. Banks are distinctive in that they tend to have relatively
little equity when compared to other firmsbanks tend to receive
ninety percent of their capital funding from debt." Moreover, a
significant portion of that debt is in the form of transaction accounts,
which are payable on demand at par and are 'readily transferable by
the accountholder to third parties. 18 A high percentage of bank assets,
however, are in the form of relatively illiquid commercial loans or
16 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure: The Politicization of a Social
Problem, 45 STAN. L. REV. 289, 290 (1992) (book review); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring and the Market for Bank Control, 88 C.OEUbi. L. REV.
1153, 1155 (1988) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Bank Failures].
17 See Helen A. Garten, Whatever Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?, 1991 ANN.
SURV. Am. L. 749, 758 (1991) (noting that bank equity levels, which approached 15% of
bank assets in 1933, fell to approximately 4% of assets by the 1970s) [hereinafter Garten,
Whatever Happened]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit
Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities, 12
YALE j. ON REG. 1, 3 (1995).
18 By contrast, the debt of most firsts comes due at some scheduled time in the future.
See, e.g., Jerrie L. Chiu, Note, Introducing Market Discipline into the Federal Deposit Insurance
System: O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC., 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 197, 204-05 (1995).
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mortgages.0 No other financial intermediary combines such a poten-
tially dangerous mix of highly liquid liabilities and illiquid assets. 2°
The asymmetry of the maturity structure of bank assets and li-
abilities makes banks especially vulnerable to liquidity crises. If a sub-
stantial portion of a bank's depositors wish to withdraw their money at
the same time, commonly referred to as a bank "run," the bank would
face an immediate and severe liquidity crisis that could be fatal to the
institution. The batik might be forced to liquidate assets, even
profitable ones, quickly and at discounted prices. If that liquidation
effort and other efforts to raise cash (such as interbank borrowing)
proved unsuccessful in stopping the run, the bank would have to
close.
Bank runs represent a classic prisoner's dilemma. Depositors, as a
whole, are better off if they do not simultaneously seek to withdraw
their money from a bank. Individual accountholders, however, are
better off adopting a "me-first" attitude.. Being among the first to
withdraw funds from the bank increases the chances that the deposi-
tor will get his or her money before the bank's ability to obtain cash is
exhausted and the institution must close its doors. 21 Accordingly, once
they begin, bank runs tend to take.on a life of their own. 22
A bank run may occur because the public receives news that the
institution is facing a significant loss or that bank management has
engaged in fraudulent activities. Bank runs also can occur for a variety
of reasons that have nothing to do with whether the institution is sol-
vent or well-managed. 23 Bank runs may even occur when the public
receives misinformation about the financial or managerial condition
of a bank,24 In fact, inaccurate information may crowd out the truth;
19 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at 1156; E. Gerald Corrigan, Are
Banks Special?, ANN. REP. FED. RES. BANK OF MINN. (1982) (available via link at Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Annual Report Essays (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http://www.
woodrowmpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/ar/ >).
29 See Fischel et at, supra note 10, at 306-07. By contrast, mutual funds hold liquid as-
sets and have liquid liabilities; pension funds have illiquid assets and illiquid liabilities. See
id. at 306. •
21 See, e.g., id. at 307-08; Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at 1156-57; R.
Mark Williamson, Regulatory Theory and Deposit insurance Reform, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 105,
112 (1994).
22 See Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at 1169. Today, the federal gov-
ernment's support system for banks and their depositors alleviates the danger of runs. See
infra text accompanying notes 33-38.
2s See Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at 1168-69.
24 According to some theory and evidence, accountholders and other market partici-
pants hai'e less reliable information about banks and their assets than they do about other
firms. See infra Part VI.A. The lack of reliable and easily understandable information about
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informed depositors, who know that the information is false, cannot
ignore the information merely because they know it to be erroneous.
Rather, informed depositors must take into account the reaction of ill-
informed accountholders in deciding whether to withdraw their
money, as the actions of ill-informed accountholders may precipitate
the fatal run.25
 Accordingly, banks—even well-managed banks—are
susceptible to failure due to liquidity runs in ways in which other
firms and financial institutions are not.
B. Systemic Risks
Bank runs have been viewed as potentially troubling not only be-
cause of their capacity to harm otherwise healthy and well-managed
banking institutions on an individual basis, but also because individ-
ual bank failures pose a systemic risk to the banking system and the
broader economy. The classic concern is that a run at one bank may
cause depositors at other banks to panic. 26 Through contagion, a li-
quidity problem at one institution may spread to other depository in-
stitutions in the same town or region of the country and, in extreme
crises, extend throughout the national banking system Y 7 Nationwide
banks may increase the risk of depositor misinformation and the likelihood that misinfor-
mation will spread. See Williamson, supra note 21, at 114-16. Information defects of this
sort are considered by many as a classic rationale for government regulation and supervi-
sion. See id. The system of subordinated debt proposed in this Article will increase the
transparency of banks. See infra Part V.C.
26 See Douglas W Diamond & Philip H. Dybuig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Li-
quidity, 91 J. Pot. Ecort. 401, 402 (1983); Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at
1169, 1186-87.
26 See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 18, at 205.
27 See Fed. Res. Gov. Laurence H. Meyer, Remarks Before,the Spring 1998 Banking and
Finance Lecture, Widener Univ. (Apr. 16, 1998) (available at The Federal Reserve Board,
Federal Reserve Board Speech from 04/16/98 (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/199804162.html>) [hereinafter Meyer, Widener
Univ.]. Some commentators regard as highly unlikely the potential for systemic contagion.
See, e.g., Fische] et al, supra note 10, at 310-11. Professor Fischel and his colleagues argue,
for example, that one banles troubles due to dishonest management or problem loans
made to a particular borrower or sector of the economy will not affect depositors at other
institutions, who have no reason to believe their accounts are less secure than before. See
id. In the view of Professor Fischel and his colleagues, bank failures can inform depositors
of conditions at other banks only if the other banks have similar risk profiles. See id. From
this perspective, the likelihood of individual bank failures leading to system-wide conta-
gion is remote. See id.; see also Oedel, Puzzling Banking Law, supra note 15, at 528-29 (de-
scribing contagion risk as remote but acknowledging that it is a "nagging possibility").
Other commentators, however, caution against dismissing too lightly the systemic risk of
bank failures, especially in a world of imperfect information. See John H. Kareken, Deposit
Insurance Reform,. or Deregulation Is the Cart, Not the Horse, FED. Ras. BANK MINN. Q. REV.,
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bank runs of this sort occurred periodically in the eighteenth century
and the first half of the nineteenth century, prior to the advent of
federal government deposit guarantees. 28 The problem of contagion,
although not confined to banking, is more severe in banking than in
other industries. 29
Another systemic concern is that the failure of banks could have
effects outside the banking industry. When banks face a significant
demand for cash that cannot be satisfied through such means as in-
terbank borrowing, banks must recall loans. The recall of good loans
disrupts the productive financing of investments and use of assets by
bank borrowers." In addition, banks facing a run on their deposits
will be unwilling to extend additional credit to borrowers or to roll
over existing lines of credit.
Bank failures also could potentially have significant macroeco-
nomic effects because of the central position that banks, especially
certain very large banks, occupy in our monetary and financial sys-
tem. Although the significance of banks in the financial system has
declined over the past few decadeS, 81 the banking system still plays a
key role in the money supply process. The stability of the electronic,
large-dollar payment system, through which billions of dollars move
daily, and the liquidity of the securities, financial derivatives and in-
terbank funding markets are all dependent on the soundness and
Winter 1990, at 6. That caution would seem warranted because bank failures affect large
numbers of small depositors, who will not necessarily be well informed and who may start
runs at other banks regardless of the risks faced by such institutions. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
" See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960,108,157,355-57 (1963) (describing the nationwide banking
panics of 1893,1907 and the 1930s).
2g Cf. Michael E. Don & Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations under the Securities In-
vestor Protection Act and their Impact on Securities Transfers, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 509,511-13
(1990) (describing the contagion effect of the brokerage industry's back-office crisis in the
1960s and how this led to the enactment of the Securities Investor Protection Act).
"SerDiamond & Dybuig, supra note 25. at 401-02. Some commentators argue that, in
this regard, the effects of the failure of a bank are no different than the effects of the fail-
ure of any other firm. See Fischel at al., supra note 10, at 312. These commentators point
out that, in the same manner that the failure of a bank disrupts the activities of its borrow-
ers, the failure of a manufacturing firm disrupts the businesses of its suppliers and cus-
tomers. See id. Furthermore, if there are close substitutes for the failed bank's credit—ei-
ther from other banks or from nonbank financial intermediaries—the bank's borrowers
may not experience a significant disruption in their business activities due to the loss of
bank credit. See id.
Sr See Oedel, Puzzling Banking Lam, supra note 15, at 537-42 (arguing that banks no
longer serve such a critical macroeconomic role as to warrant special regulatory and su-
pervisory treatment).
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proper functioning of the banking system." Accordingly, the wide-
spread failure of banks, or the failure of certain very large banks,
could cause an unexpected disruption in the money supply, which
certain empirical evidence suggests could lead to dislocations in the
economy that may worsen, or even cause, an economic downturn.
C. Federal Safety Net
Most of the fears about bank runs and systemic contagion were
alleviated with the advent of the federal "safety net," the key elements
of which were put in place as a result of the banking panics of 1907
and 1929 and the Great Depression. The safety net, which places the
full faith and credit of the United States behind the banking system,
has three primary elements: (1) federal insurance of bank deposits up
to $100,000; (2) access for banks to emergency cash through the Fed-
eral Reserve's discount window; and (3) access for banks to the Fed-
eral Reserve's payment system." With deposit insurance, most ac-
countholders no longer face a prisoner's dilemma in a bank run, as
they know that the federal government will back the deposits that they
hold in a bank (up to $100,000) regardless of the health of the institu-
don. 34 Access to the discount window gives banks facing temporary
liquidity crises—due to unexpected withdrawals, operational prob-
lems or various factors outside the bank's control—a means of meet-
ing depositors' cash demands without liquidating assets." The Federal
32 See Fed. Res. Gov. Laurence H. Meyer, Remarks at the Financial Inst. Center, Univ. of
Tenn. (Sept. 18, 1998) (available at The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Board Speech
from 09/18/1998 (visited Feb. 21, 2000) Chttp://www.federah-eserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1998/19980918.1mul>) [hereinafter Meyer, Univ. of Tenn.]; Meyer, Widener
Univ., supra note 27.
33 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at 1157-58. For a description of
the Federal Reserve's discount window operations and the payment system, see FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 45-52, 94-107 (8th ed. 1994) [hereinafter PUR-
POSES & FUNCTIONS].
54 Professors fiiedman and Schwartz credit federal deposit insurance with virtually
eliminating bank runs and contributing greatly to monetary stability. See FRIEDMAN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 440-42. Recent banking panics have occurred in situations
where federal deposit insurance did not exist. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note
16, at 1158 n.18. For example, in the 1980s, panics occurred among state-chartered, non-
federally insured depository institutions in Ohio and Maryland. See id. While federal de-
posit insurance can be credited with eliminating bank runs, federal insurance also has had
the detrimental effect of eliminating depositor monitoring of bank risk taking. See infra
text accompanying notes 44-47.
33 See, e.g., PURPOSES & FuNcrioNs, supra note 33, at 48; Macey & Miller, Bank Failures,
supra note 16, at 1158.
March 2000J	 Subordinated Debt	 205
Reserve's payment system ensures riskless settlement of financial
transactions."
The safety net, which is a strong prophylactic for bank runs, has
in itself given rise to another reason—and, in the minds of many
commentators, the only valid reason—for bank regulation and super-
vision." The federal government, and thereby the federal taxpayer, is
now ultimately responsible for bank deposits and the orderly func-
tioning of the banking system and has a direct financial stake in keep-
ing bank risks under control. The government's interest is akin to that
of a private insurance company, which has a stake in controlling the
risks of its policyholders."
II. INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT APPROACH TO BANK REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION
As described in the previous Part, the federal government has
created a safety net to reduce the incidence of bank failures and the
systemic shocks that may accompany such failures. That safety net,
however, creates incentives for excessive risk taking by banking or-
ganizations. The safety net also eliminates many of the incentives for
private-sector monitoring of bankS' risk-taking activities. The govern-
ment relies principally on regulation and supervisory oversight as a
surrogate for private-sector monitoring of bank activities and disci-
plining of excessive bank risk taking. This public-sector apparatus,
however, is both less efficient and less effective than a system that util-
izes market-based disciplinary forces.
The federal safety net, in general, and deposit insurance, in par-
ticular, have created a twin set of problems. First, the safety net gives
rise to a "moral hazard" problem, one that is common to all types of
insurance." The safety net creates incentives for banks to take larger
56 During the bank panic of 1907, cash payments were suspended throughout the
country as many banks and clearinghouses refused to clear checks drawn on certain other
banks, a practice that led to the failure of otherwise solvent banks. See PURPOSES & FUNC
TIONS, supra note 33, at 93.
37 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at 1162.
58 See, e.g., Meyer, Univ. of Tenn., supra note 32.
" See, e.g., id. The moral hazard concept is a straight-forward one; if a person bears the
risk of a loss, that person will take affirmative steps to limit the risk of that loss—either by
being more careful or reducing the level of the particular activity to an efficient degree.
On the other hand, when a person is insured against the loss, the person lacks incentive to
take steps to mitigate the risk of that loss. This lack of incentive to mitigate risks is the
moral hazard. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 18, at 203; William Safire, Moral Hazard, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Dec. 20, 1998, at 30.
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risks than they otherwise would because the rewards of any gamble
accrue principally to the bank's management and owners but the risks
fall largely on the safety net. 40 This same problem of excessive risk tak-
ing exists in the private insurance context. There, insurers use con-
tractual devices, including risk-adjusted premiums, deductibles and
co-insurance, to limit the risk taking of insured entities. The federal
government has tried to implement some of these devices, but with
only limited success.' 1
 Instead, the government has relied largely on
supervision and regulation.
Second, at the same time as it leads to increased risk taking by
banks, deposit insurance leads to reduced monitoring and sensitivity
to risk on the part of creditors, shareholders and managers—the
three corporate constituencies that, in the normal firm setting, moni-
tor and manage the risk profile of an enterprise. In the usual corpo-
rate setting, creditors have a powerful incentive to monitor firm risks.
Creditors are the most risk averse of the three corporate constituen-
cies because they are entitled to a fixed rate of return. Accordingly,
debtholders oversee the activities of an enterprise to ensure that the
firm's ventures produce a reliable stream of income to permit pay-
ment of interest and principal on the debt but do not involve a
40
 See, e.g., Fischel et al., supra note 10, at 314; Williamson, supra note 21, at 120-21;
Meyer, Univ. of Tenn., supra note 32. In fact, some commentators have argued that it was
expressly for this purpose that the safety net and deposit insurance were designed: to per-
suade cautious Depression-era bank managers to make risky business and agricultural
loans and, thereby, alleviate the severe credit crunch of the 1930s. See Gallen, Whatever
Happened, supra note 17, at 758-59.
41
 For example, in 1991, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act ("FDICIA"), Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which substituted a risk-adjusted federal deposit insurance
premium for the then-existing flat-rate premium on deposit insurance coverage. Some
commentators have noted that the use of risk-based deposit insurance premiums, if accu-
rately priced, would eliminate the moral hazard of deposit insurance and serve as a substi-
tute for forms of market discipline. See Chiu, supra note 18, at 209.
For risk-based deposit insurance to work, the insurance premium must be accurately
priced to reflect the riskiness of a bank's activities. One commentator has cautioned
against viewing risk-based premiums as a panacea because the establishment and mainte-
nance of an insurance pricing scheme that accurately reflects an institution's risk profile is
a "formidable task." Williamson, supra note 21, at 122-23; accord Fischel et al., supra note
10, at 316 (noting that calculation of risk-based premiums requires additional expendi-
tures on information and personnel).
Evidence suggests that, in any event, risk-based premiums are not being used currently
to limit the risk-taking activities of banks. For example, for the first half of 1998, virtually
no banks were assessed insurance premiums. Similarly, in the second half of 1998, only 577
of over 10,000 (fewer than 6%) FDIC-insured depository institutions paid a risk-based
premium.. See Scott Barancik, FDIC Premiums to Remain at Zero far Nearly Everyone, Am.
BANKER, Oct. 28, 1998, at 3.
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significant risk of loss that may interfere with the firm's debt servicing
obligations.°
Equityholders and nianagers (who are often equityholders them-
selves) tend to be more accepting of risk than debtholders, because
equityholders and managers stand to gain—either through capital
appreciation, increased dividends or increased compensation—if risky
ventures succeed. Equityholders and managers, however, cannot af-
ford to ignore the risk preferences of creditors because doing so
could cut the firm off from reasonably priced debt funding. In faCt,
the willingness of equityholders and managers to enter into agree-
ments with debtholders that limit..risk taking, such as restrictive debt
covenants, may serve as a signal to other (debt and equity) investors
of the firm's prudent risk posture.° By contrast, an enterprise with a
reputation for excessive risk taking or poor risk management will
likely need to pay a premium for debt financing, which will reduce
the resources that the firm has available to pay dividends to equity-
holders and bonuses to management. In more extreme situations,
excessive risk-taking activities may make it difficult or impossible for
the firm to attract and retain business creditors, and the exit of credi-
tors from a firm may precipitate the firm's collapse. 44 .
Deposit insurance shelters banks from the disciplinary forces that
exist in the ordinary corporate setting. Depositors—the largest group
of bank creditors—have little incentive not only to guard against ex-
cessive risk taking, but even to police management self-dealing, defal-
cation or fraud because the funds that most depositors lend to banks
are guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") 45; the FDIC provides guaranteed coverage at least up to
42 Debtholders typically do not have representation on a corporation's board of dit'ee-
ton. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE 14. 1197,1211-12 (1984). They
monitor firm activities through contractual devices and regular oversight of borrower af-
fairs. See id. (describing the manner in which lenders protect their interests); see also infra
Part
43 See Helen A. Gallen, Market Discipline Revisited, 14 ANN. REV. OF BANKING L. 187,197
(1995) (hereinafter Garten, Market Discipline Revisited].
" See, e.g., George G. Triantis & Ronald j. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073,1085-86 (1995) (describing how creditor exit can create
a sense of urgency to motivate bank management and shareholders to take corrective ac-
tion).
45 See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 18, at 211-12; Macey & Miller. Bank Failures. supra note 16,
at 1167. Professor Gallen posits that in the past two decades insured deposits have de-
creased as a percentage of bank assets, and banks have turned to alternative funding
sources, including repurchase agreements and Eurodollar and foreign deposits. See Gar-
ten, Whatever Happened, supra note 17, at 759-60. The statistics bear out Professor Garten's
theory. See infra note 78. According to Professor Gallen, these alternative funding sources
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$100,000.46
 Large uninsured depositors also have little incentive to
monitor banks because the risk of loss to even uninsured depositors
has been slight. In the past, the FDIC has paid large depositors an av-
erage of 99.5% of their funds regardless of the amount of their depos-
its.}
The absence of creditor monitoring allows shareholders and
management to be less concerned with risk. Shareholders and man-
agers know that depositors, secure in the knowledge that their depos-
its are guaranteed by the FDIC, will not demand a premium for plac-
ing their funds in a risky bank. Moreover, if a bank approaches
insolvency, debtholders will not function as a check on managers' and
equityholders' proclivity to taking excessive gambles."
Theoretically, at least, the absence of debtholder monitoring
need not be problematic. The regulatory scheme places government
in the position that debtors typically occupy in the system of corporate
governance. Government employs supervisory, enforcement, and
other tools to regulate and monitor bank activities." Indeed, govern-
are risk sensitive, and the reliance of banks (especially large banks) on such funding
sources removes some of their traditional insulation front normal corporate and market
disciplinary forces. See Gallen, Whatever Happened, supra note 17, at 758. Professor Callen
acknowledges, however, that the sensitivity of these uninsured creditors to risk is unclear.
See id. at 760. We believe that these interbank and intercorporate creditors are not risk-
sensitive, at least not to the degree necessary to monitor bank behavior. See infra Part 111.C.
46
 Depositors may use a variety of methods to obtain more than $100,000 of insurance
coverage at a particular institution. For example, a husband and wife may secure up to
$300,000 of insurance for deposits held at one bank by maintaining one account in the
husband's name, one account in the wife's name and one joint account in both names. See
FDIC, Your Insured Deposit (visited Feb. 22, 2000) Chttp://www.fdic.gov/depositide-
posits/insured/index.hunl>.
47 Chiu, supra note 18, at 211; see also Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at
1179 (noting how the FDIC's practices exacerbate the disincentives for depositors to moni-
tor banks). In the 1980s, the FDIC.developed a preference for resolving bank failures in a
manner that ensured payment to both insured and uninsured depositors. See, e.g., David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV.
723, 769 (1998). Congress attempted to curb this practice with the passage of FDICIA. See
id. at 739-40, 770-71; infra Part VI.B.
48
 If deposit insurance were priced to reflect the riskiness of a bank's activities, share-
holders and managers would likely be more concerned about the institution's risks. Riskier
banks would be assessed higher premiums and, consequently, would have less money for
stockholder dividends and management bonuses. See Chiu, supra note 18, at 212-23. As
noted above, however, over 94% of banks are not assessed any insurance premium. See
discussion in supra note 41.
49
 For example, the federal banking agencies have broad powers to require "prompt
corrective action" when a depository institution is undercapitalized. In addition, bank
regulators may commence "cease and desist" proceedings against banks, their parent hold-
ing companies or certain of their affiliates if regulators determine that these institutions
are engaging in unsafe or unsound practices. For a description of some of the enforce-
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meat regulators and supervisors would appear to have the tools and
resources to be better monitors than depositors and other private-
sector creditors." Government regulators, who specialize in the trade
of banking supervision and regulation, could be more adept at risk-
monitoring than the average bank creditor and have a panoply of
statutory and regulatory remedies to curb excessive risk taking and
punish malfeasance that are not available to bank creditors.
Notwithstanding these apparent superiorities, the substitution of
the public sector for the private sector creates a less efficient and less
effective monitoring system. First, private-sector entities monitor firms
at an efficient level; they monitor firms until the marginal costs of
such monitoring are equal to its marginal. benefits." Government
regulation and supervision, on the other hand, is not subject to this
calculus and is less likely to be as efficient. In some instances there
may be excessive supervision and regulation,52 while in other situa-
tions there may be inadequate monitoring." Second, private-sector
monitors have more reliable monitoring incentives. Private-sector
monitors have their own money at risk and, therefore, have powerful
went tools available to bank regulators, see PAULINE B. Har.ER. & MELANIE FEIN, FEDERAL
BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW §§ 5.09—.13 (rev. ed. 1999).
50 Many commentators have argued that depositors would be poor disciplinarians. See
Gallen. Still Banking on the Market, supra note 7, at 242-44. This Article discusses the rela-
tive merits of depositor discipline versus other forms of market-based discipline in Part III.
infra.
51 See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at 1167-68.
52 The U.S. bank regulatory structure is extraordinarily complex, with shared and
overlapping jurisdictions for various federal and state authorities. This system creates the
potential that a single bank holding company with multiple bank subsidiaries may need to
deal with three federal bank regulatory. .agencies (the Federal Reserve, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and the FDIC) and an equal number of state regu-
lators. For an example of how this system functions, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
U.S. SENATE, INTERSTATE BANKING: BENEFITS AND RISKS OF REMOVING REGULATORY RE-
STRICTIONS 187-94 (1993). These overlaps can lead to comical results: Former Treasury
Secretary Lloyd Bentsen was fond of telling all apocryphal tale that members of Congress
often repeated about twenty-six examiners converging at a single bank location at one time
so that their cars filled the parking lot and left no place for the bank's customers. See Hear-
ings on Interstate Banking and Branching before Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation
and Deposit Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fiduciary and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 15
(1993) (statement of Rep. Sam Johnson). For a discussion of how this intricate "Balkan-
ized" system came to be, see sources cited in infra note 162; see also Meyer, Widener Univ.,
supra note 27.
55 Insufficient government monitoring may be the result of inadequate or misallocated
resources. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 16, at 1169 (citing a former Chair-
man of the FDIC regarding the shortage of bank examiners and the serious threat to the
safety and soundness of the banking system posed by this shortage).
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incentives to act with greater alacrity than public-sector bureaucrats.
In addition, private-sector monitors have at their disposal contractual
devices designed specifically for the purpose of causing borrowers to
internalize the costs of risky activities. Such contractual devices are
not available to government regulators, who instead need to rely on
less precise and generally applicable regulatory requirements. 54
The relative effectiveness of private-sector monitoring may be
further enhanced by the singleness of purpose of private oversight.
Private-sector investors have a single goal—protecting their invest-
ment—and their success or failure is measured solely by their ability
to achieve this financial goal. Government regulators, on the other
hand, may have political and other goals that temper their monitor-
ing efforts. For example, political capture of a regulator by a regu-
lated institution or industry may compromise the effectiveness of the
supervisory and regulatory process." Alternatively, competition
among the various bank regulators may lead to regulatory laxity, in
the classic "race to the bottom" fashion. 56
 Political compromises also
may give rise to statutory or regulatory restrictions that are unrelated
to banking safety—such as the long-standing limitations on banks'
insurance and securities underwriting and dealing activities.57 These
limitations, many of which were in place for over sixty years despite
widespread acknowledgment that they served little or no safety and
soundness purposes, needlessly barred banks from engaging in
profitable activities and diversifying their risks."
Finally, even regulators who are not distracted by competing
goals and pressures may find effective oversight to be a difficult task,
given the broad range of activities in which banks and their parent
54 See Fischel et al., supra note 10, at 315.
55 Cf. Oedel, supra note 15, at 490-92 (noting the limitations of political capture the-
ory).
56
 The recent failure of the First National Bank of Keystone, West Virginia highlights
this problem. In this failure, which may cost the federal deposit insurance fund over $750
million, the OCC, the bank's chartering authority, reportedly prevented the FDIC, the
bank's insurance examiner, from gaining access to the bank. See Marcy Gordon, Bank Fail-
we Prompts Bid for Greater FDIC Power, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 1999, at B3.
57
 SeeMacey & Miller, Bank Failures, supra note 10, at 1170-71.
m See Gallen, Regulatory Growing Pains, supra note 10, at 512-13; see also J. Virgil Mat-
tingly & Kieran J. Fallon, Understanding the Issues Raised by Financial Modernization, 2 N.C.
BANKING INST. 25, 37 (1998) (noting "general consensus" regarding the need to permit
banking firms to engage in securities and insurance activities). Although this was the pre-
dominant view, there were a few dissenters. See Don More, Note, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall:
An Argument Against Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 433, 439 (taking a differ-
ent approach from the "almost imanimous[j call ... to replace Glass-Steagall").
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holding companies engage." The size and complexity of banks se-
verely tax the ability of bank regulators to engage in effective monitor-
ing." Banks now routinely conduct a wide array of complicated de-
rivative, securitization and other types of transactions to generate fee
income and to manage risks. Moreover, the last few decades have seen
the advent of truly global financial institutions that integrate a variety
of banking and nonbanking businesses into the same multinational
enterprise.61
The trend of financial conglomerization and product di-
versification will, if anything, accelerate under the framework estab-
lished in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which permits banks to affiliate
with securities firms, mutual funds, insurance companies, futures
commission merchants and merchant banking firms. Broad, prophy-
lactic rules that restricted the activities of banks and their affiliates—
and which made monitoring bank activities more straightforward—
have been swept away by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Under these in-
creasingly complicated circumstances, using private-sector monitors
to complement the efforts of government regulators is likely to result
in better risk monitoring and contro1. 62
III. MARKET DISCIPLINE: BENEFITS AND SOURCES
The previous Part discussed some of the significant limitations of
the current approach to bank regulation and supervision, which relies
59 For example, in the recent failure of the First National Bank of Keystone, there is
evidence that bank examiners did not understand the complex activities of the bank. See
Gordon, supra note 56.
w See, e.g., Mantripragada, supra note 5, at 550 (noting that the "bank examination sys-
tem has not kept pace with banking practices"); Meyer, Widener Univ., supra note 27
("Technological change, financial innovation, the acquisition of new powers by banking
organizations, the increasing geographic scope of banks, and the globalization of financial
markets all challenge our ability to examine and assess the safety and soundness of indi-
vidual banking firms.").
61
 To cite one example, UBS AG, a Swiss bank, engages in the United States in leasing
activities, trust company functions, providing financial and investment advisory services,
securities brokerage and futures colinnission merchant services, securities underwriting
and dealing, buying and trading bullion and related instruments, engaging in COMMUllity
development activities and acting as general partner for various investment limited part-
nerships. See UBS AG, Order Approving Acquisition of Nonbanking Companies and Estab-
lishment of U.S. Branches, 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 684 (1998).
62 To the extent that the government is less effective than private-sector parties in
monitoring bank activities, banks are able to externalize sonic of the costs of their risky
activities. See Fischer et al., supra note 10, at 315. Using market forces to complement the
government regulatory and supervisory system will force banks to internalize the costs of
their risky activities.
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almost exclusively on the government to monitor bank risk taking.
Many of these shortcomings in bank regulation can be ameliorated by
an increased use of market discipline—that is, by heightening the
ability of private providers of bank capital (stockholders, depositors or
other debtholders) to influence bank behavior and to restrict exces-
sive bank risk taking.
There are three ways in which market discipline promises to
benefit the existing bank regulatory and supervisory structure. First,
private suppliers of funds to a bank will constrain bank behavior
through enforcement of contractual restrictions by debt investors and
exercise of voting tights by stockholders. Regulators will be able to
observe how the private sector responds to bank activities—such as
what conditions are being imposed in debt contracts—and, thereby,
determine what risks the market believes are material. Second, private
actors that have already invested in a bank will punish inappropriate
bank behavior by selling their shares or bonds in the secondary mar-
ket. A declining share or bond price in the secondary market will pro-
vide a signal to bank management and to third parties, such as bank
regulators, that an institution is moving in an unhealthy direction. 63
Third, investors in the primary market that are contemplating an in-
vestment in a particular bank will exact a premium from a bank if they
believe that the bank is engaging in risky activities. 64
This Article proposes a program to enhance the market's ability
to regulate bank behavior and thereby take advantage of the private
sector as a watchdog. Use of private-sector monitors is necessitated by
the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which permits banking
organizations to engage for the first time in a broad array of new ac-
tivities.65
63
 The secondary market is the market in which existing securities are traded. The
primary market is the market in which new securities are offered by a firm to investors for
the first time.
64
 Prospective providers of capital in the primary securities market are particularly
adept reviewers of a company's behavior. When a company issues a new class of securities,
new potential investors or investment banking concerns representing the new investors
will scrutinize carefully the affairs of the issuer. As a conseqUence, a bank that must peri-
odically enter the capital markets to obtain financing can be expected to behave prudently
to obtain the approval of potential future investors. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-
Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN. REV. 650, 653-55 (1984). Market participants
corroborate this view. See BOARD OF GOV. OF FED. RES. SIST., STAFF STUMM:). 172, USING
SUBORDINATED DEBT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 16 (1999) [hereinafter,
USING SUBORDINATED I) EBTJ
63 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 101-161, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341-
84 (1999) (permitting banking firms to engage freely in activities that are "financial" in
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The first step in designing a program that deploys private-sector
resources to assist bank regulators is to determine which participant
in the financial markets is in the best position to monitor bank activi-
ties and discipline high-risk banks. The first criterion for selecting this
market participant is the participant's ability to monitor and disci-
pline banks effectively. The second criterion is the alignment or
commonality of that participant's interests with the interests of the
federal government as bank regulator. The greater the commonality
of interests between the market participant and the federal govern-
ment, the greater the likelihood that the market participant will take
the same posture as the government with respdct to bank risk taking.
Similarly, the closer the alignment of interests, the more information
the government will be able to glean by observing the market partici-
pant's behavior.
There are three potential private-sector contenders for this regu-
latory duty: equityholders, both common and preferred; depositors;
and other creditors. We examine each in turn.
A. Eq ttityhoklers
1. Common Stockholders
Holders of common stock have some natural advantages as disci-
plinarians vis-a-vis other market participants. First, common equity-
holders have a unique ability to monitor bank activities. They possess
legal rights to inspect the books and records of a corporation, and
equityholders in a publicly held company are entitled to receive peri-
odic financial and other information about the corporation and its
operations.66 More importantly, common stockholders have tools to
enforce their will directly on a firm and its management. Common
stockholders elect the directors of a company and, through the direc-
tors, appoint the company's management and supervise its opera-
tions. If common stockholders do not approve of the conduct of their
company, they can exercise their voting power to change the com-
pany's directors, management and policies: Moreover, state corporate
law generally confers upon the directors and officers of a corporation
nature and to engage, upon a determination from regulators, in activities that are "inci-
dental" to and "complementary" to financial activities).
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 79n (a) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1991 & Supp. 1998); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a (1999); 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.2, 208.16 & 335.401 (1999).
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a fiduciary duty to act in the interests of common stockholders and
not in the interest of creditors or other corporate constituencies.°
In addition, if equityholders are dissatisfied with the firm's per-
formance, they generally have the right and ability to sell their stock
in a publicly held corporation. An exodus of stockholders will create
sell-side pressure on the corporation's stock price. Corporate manag-
ers, who themselves are typically stockholders, will act in the interests
of stockholders to prevent such sales and the resulting decline in the
company's stock price.
Despite these relative advantages, holders of common stock
would not be the best purveyors of market discipline to banks, in part
because their interests are not well-aligned with the paramount inter-
est of the government in averting (or at least cabining the systemic
and other risks of) bank failure. Common stockholders prefer higher-
yield strategies than other corporate constituencies and the federal
government.° A bank's income must cover debt charges before it can
be shared with equityholders and, while shareholders' risk of loss
cannot exceed the amount they originally invested in the corporation,
their potential gain is limited only by the size of the future earnings
stream of the company.° Consequently, the primary incentive of
common stockholders, especially well-diversified stockholders, is to
maximize the expected profitability of the companies in which they
have invested—and not necessarily to limit risk taking."
67 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 8'72 (Del. 1985); Guth v Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). But
see Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 27, 32-33 (1996) (discussing state laws that require corporate managers to consider the
interests of other firm stakeholders in certain decisional contexts).
" See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
69
 Professors Macey and hillier point out that, prior to the advent of deposit insurance,
a system of "double liability" was imposed on bank shareholders to force them to better
monitor bank risks. See Macey & Miller, Double Liability, supra note 5, at 31. Under this sys-
tem, if a bank failed, the institution's receiver would assess its shareholders an amount up
to the par value of their stock so that shareholders would not only lose their initial invest-
ment in the stock but also lose a further sum out-of-pocket. See id.
The use of double liability to spur shareholder monitoring of bank risk would be un-
workable in today's world, which Macey and Miller implicitly recognize. To begin with,
double liability schemes would face numerous administrative problems: who is liable, how
is the assessment to be enforced. what if the shareholder is outside the jurisdiction. Per-
haps more importantly, imposing double liability on bank stockholders would increase the
cost of capital to U.S. banks, placing them at a significant competitive disadvantage to their
foreign counterparts and their non-bank competitors.
. 70 See RICHARD A. BREALEy & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
59-62 (5th ed. 1996); see also John R. Hall et al., Do Equity Markets and Regulators View
Bank Holding Company Risk Similarly? A Comparison of Market-Based Risk Measures and
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Moreover, as a firm moves closer to insolvency, common share-
holders may have additional incentives to encourage risky activities. In
insolvency, shareholders stand last in line for repayment of their ini-
tial investment, and shareholders may not receive any portion of their
investment on liquidation of the firm. Therefore, common share-
holders of a distressed firm may prefer that the firm take greater risks
to gamble its way back to solvency."
These risk preferences are not consistent with the primary goal
of bank regulation. Thus, although shareholders have powerful in-
centives to monitor and influence bank behavior and the legal
authority to supervise and control effectively such behavior, share-
holders' motives are not sufficiently aligned with those of bank regu-
lators."
2. Preferred Stockholders
Having determined that common shareholders are oat a good
source of market discipline, we next look to preferred shareholders as
another possible class of equityholders that may exert discipline on
banks. Preferred stockholders are more risk averse than their com-
mon stockholding brethren. Preferred stock generally is entitled to
receive a fixed dividend and has a fixed preference upon liquidation
of the company. 73 For this reason, the incentive of a preferred stock-
holder is not simply to maximize the risk-adjusted profitability of the
company but, rather, to ensure a steady and perpetual stream of pre-
ferred dividends. The incentives of preferred stockholders, therefore,
Regulators' BOPEC Scores (Dec. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on Me with the authors)
(finding that equity market participants focus on risk-return trade-off, not on probability
of failure of institutions in which they invest).
71 See Chin, supra note 18, at 210; Triantis & Daniels, supra note 44, at 1111.
72 Most banks, and certainly most large banks, are subsidiaries of holding companies.
One commentator has argued that holding company shareholders can serve as market
disciplinarians of their subsidiary banks. See Gamin, supra note 5, at 333-34. Bank holding
companies—including new financial holding companies that were created by the G•amm-
Leach-Bliley Act—are required by federal regulation to be a source of strength for their
subsidiary banks and, as controlling shareholders of their subsidiary banks, can easily con-
trol bank behavior. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (1998).
Nonetheless, holding companies are equityholders hi their bank subsidiaries and
therefore suffer from the same incentive misalignments described above. Holding compa-
nies probably suffer even more severe incentive misalignments than other bank share-
holders because holding companies typically control other nonbanking companies and
may have motivations to benefit their nonbank subsidiaries at the expense of their bank
subsidiaries. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattel, Organizational Freedom for Banks:
The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (1997).
73 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 360-61.
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are more closely aligned with those of bank regulators. The incentives
are not, however, aligned with the government as well as the interest
of debtholders.74
 The claims of a preferred stockholder are junior to
the claims of all the creditors of a company,'" including, in the case of
a bank, depositors and the FDIC. This ranking again gives preferred
shareholders a greater incentive to allow bank risk taking because, in
a liquidation, they will only be paid after all the creditors' claims are
fully satisfied.
Preferred stock has three further disadvantages as an indicator of
a bank's risk position that, along with the incentive misalignment,
lead us to search elsewhere for the most efficient source of private
discipline. First, preferred stockholders generally do not have voting
rights; the ability of preferred stockholders to control the behavior of
a company is limited to negotiated voting rights in the certificate of
designations or other instrument creating the preferred stock. Sec-
ond, holders of preferred stock are typically unsophisticated retail
investors." Third, preferred stock is a relatively uncommon capital
instrument that is rarely traded in a deep, liquid secondary market. 77
B. Depositors
The next class of private actors that is available to provide disci-
pline is a bank's depositors. In many respects, depositors are a natural
choice as a disciplining agent. First, they are a bank's most common
stakeholder." In addition, depositors generally stand in a creditor-
debtor relationship with a bank; they have loaned a sum of money to
74 See infra Part IILC.
75
 See BREALEY & Myers, supra note 70, at 360-61.
76 See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64, at 45.
" The lack of popularity of preferred stock steins, in large part, from the fact that it is
not a tax-efficient capital instrument. A bank is not permitted to deduct preferred stock
dividends from its taxable income, while a bank is permitted to deduct interest payments
to its depositors or other debtholders. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 360-61; 26
U.S.C. § 163(a) (1994).
78 See Mantripragada, supra note 5, at 553. Deposits are shrinking, however, as a source
of funding for U.S. commercial banks. See Louis Whiteman, Agriculture: Deposits Bogging
Down, Bankers Push Bill to Widen Home Loan Bank System, Am. BANKER, April 12, 1999, at 7
(noting that bank deposits grew only 1.9% from 1987 to year-end 1998); see also FDIC,
Statistics on Banking Third Quarter 1999,Table RC-1, Assets and Liabilities of FDIC-Insured Com-
mercial Banks, (visited April 3, 2000) <http://Nvww.fdie.gov/bank/statistkalistatistics/
9909/cbrc011tall>; FDIC, Statistics on Banking Fourth Quarter 1994,Table RC-I, Assets and
Liabilities of FDIC-lnsured Commercial Banks (visited April 3, 2000) <http://wwwfdic.
gov/bank/statistical/statistics/9412/cbrcOl.html > (indicating that deposits as a percent-
age of assets for insured commercial banks in the United States shrunk front 72% to 67%
between December 31, 1994 and September 30, 1999).
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a bank and have a right to withdraw that money on short notice, per-
haps earning interest during the period of the deposit. For this rea-
son, depositors do not gain if a bank engages in risky behavior. De-
positors benefit only if the bank is able to repay their deposits to
them.
One significant problem with depositor-based discipline is that,
under the current scheme of federal deposit insurance, most deposi-
tors—except for those uninsured depositors who have placed over
$100,000 with a bank—have no incentive to monitor or influence a
bank's activities. If a bank fails, the federal government will fulfill the
bank's contractual obligation to return the depositors' principal. 79
Even if deposit insurance were abolished or significantly revised
to lower the maximum amount insured or to require co-insurance or
deductibles, depositors would not be the ideal agents of market disci-
pline. Small depositors do not have the financial sophistication and
acumen necessary to monitor bank activities, especially the types of
complex financial transactions most likely to put an institution at risk,
and collective action problems would inhibit joint action. Further-
more, each depositor would have so little at risk that it would make no
financial sense for him or her to spend much time analyzing the
riskiness of the bank. Co-insurance, a scheme in which depositors
would have some money at risk, would give depositors greater incen-
tive to discipline banks than in the curent system but would still leave
depositors with something less than an adequate motivation for
watching their bank. In addition, I many depositors are not investors;
for such depositors, the convenience of a bank's location or service
menu is paramount. 8° Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
monitoring benefits of depositors generally would be outweighed by
79 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813, 1817, 1821 (1994 & Stipp. 1l 1996); see also supra Part I.C. (de-
scribing deposit insurance and other features of the federal safety net for banks).
99 See Helen A. Gallen, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks,
4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 134-36 (1986) [hereinafter Gallen, Banking on the Market]. Macey
and Garrett argue that, in the absence of federal deposit insurance, riskiness will be one of
the factors that depositors use in determining where to place their deposits. See Jonathan
R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical
and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 223-24 (1088) [hereinafter Macey &
Garrett, Market Discipline]. Nevertheless, the thrust of the argument remains: risk will be a
secondary or tertiary concern of these depositors and their decisions will seldom actually
turn on the riskiness of the bank's investments and activities. See id.; see also Wette D. Kan-
trow, Surprising Rivals Challenge British Bank Giants: Grocers, AM. BANKER, jam 14, 1999, at 1
(discussing how grocery stores in England are seizing deposits from banks).
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the increased risk of bank runs and other adverse effects in a world
without deposit insurance. 81
The typical uninsured depositor has more finds in the bank than
the typical insured depositor and, one might expect, has a greater
ability to monitor bank behavior. In addition, uninsured depositors
have incentives analogous to those of the bank regulators—they want
a bank to behave conservatively so as to ensure the return of their
principal with interest. And, if a bank were to fail, the uninsured de-
positors stand immediately below the FDIC in the capital structure
and insolvency waterfall of a bank. 82
Notwithstanding this close incentive alignment between unin-
sured depositors and government regulators, uninsured depositors
would not be good disciplinarians of bank behavior. First, despite the
size of their deposit accounts, uninsured depositors are not necessar-
ily savvy investors; many of them are simply large manufacturing or
other nonfinancial corporations parking liquid assets. These compa-
nies may not have the time or financial sophistication to monitor
closely the riskiness of the bank in which their excess cash resides.
They may choose a particular bank because of its location or range of
business services, not because of the bank's risk posture. For example,
many businesses establish accounts at banks that are willing to extend
credit to them. For most of these depositors, the transaction costs of
changing banks are enough to prevent any shifting of deposits to take
advantage of a risk differential. Second, uninsured depositors have no
de jure control over the activities of a bank and probably have in-
sufficient bargaining power—due both to the small size of their in-
vestments relative to the total assets of the bank and to the short-term
nature of their investment—to obtain contractual controls over the
81 See supra Part I. Professor Mantipragada has proposed that deposit insurance cover-
age limits should be based on the maturity of the deposits rather than the size of deposits.
See Mantripragada, supra note 5, at 571-73. Because long-term deposits are generally in-
vestments and are generally made by more wealthy and financially sophisticated individu-
als who are better capable of monitoring the relevant depository institutions, his proposal
provides disciplining incentives to the depositors most capable of accomplishing the task.
Also, because all short-term and transaction deposits would be insured, Mantripragada's
proposal theoretically would not increase the risk of bank runs. While this proposal would
be an improvement over the existing deposit insurance scheme, it would not mitigate most
of the concerns set forth in the textual paragraph. Most important among these is that
even long-term depositors have a short time horizon as compared with the bank's other
stakeholders: stockholders and long-term debtholders.
82 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (11) (1994).
March 2000]	 Subordinated Debt	 219
activities of a bank. 83 Third, uninsured depositors would be the first
possible beneficiaries of a regulatory extension of the safety net in the'
event of bank insolvency. Even if regulators were able to commit not
to bail out a bank's nondeposit creditors in the event of insolvency,
uninsured depositors may yet believe that they would receive protec-
tion from the FDIC if their bank failed. 84 Finally, uninsured depositors
generally have short-term or demand deposits; they generally have the
contractual ability to get their money back from the bank quickly and
will be most inclined to do so when the bank most needs the deposits
to stay put. This leads yet again to the specter of bank runs. 85
83 As of September 30, 1999, time deposits of $100,000 or more represented only 12%
of U.S. insured commercial bank deposits, and 83% of such time deposits matured within
one year See FDIC, Statistics on Banking Third Quarter 1999, Table RC-.5, Deposit Liabilities of
FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks, (visited April 3, 2000) Chttp://wwW.fdic.gov/bank/statist-
ical/statistics/9909/cbrc05.html >.
Macey and Garrett argue that, for some large depositors, pressuring bankers to reduce
the risk profile of the bank or raise deposit rates would be cheaper than withdrawing their
funds and finding another bank in which to invest. See Macey & Garrett. Market Discipline,
supra note 80, at 230-31. This sort of influence is rarely attempted, however, because in
most cases the costs of negotiating and monitoring are high and the costs of withdrawal
and reinvesting elsewhere are low. See Garten, Banking on the Market, supra note 80, at 154—
55.
84 See Skeel, supra note 47, at 169 (noting the FDIC's past practice of paying both in-
sured and uninsured depositors); see also Charles W. Calamiris & Robert E. Litan, Federal
Regulation in a Global Marketplace (unpublished paper presented at the Brookings Insti-
tute, on file with authors) {noting that, as consolidation in the financial services industry
increases, more institutions will be deemed "too big to fail" and regulators will be "com-
pelled" to bail out both insured and uninsured depositors should an institution run into
financial difficulties). •
85 See Gallen, Banking on the Market, supra note 80, at 136-37, 153-55. Macey and
Garrett argue that bank runs are not the only form of market discipline that depositors
can employ. See Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline, supra note 80, at 229. They believe that
banks, faced with the prospect of paying risk-adjusted interest rates to uninsured deposi-
tors, will hire risk management teams and adopt risk-aversion strategies to reduce the in-
terest rates that they otherwise would be required to pay. See id. Banks may even agree to
contractual conunitments to uninsured depositors to reduce such rates. See id.
These ex ante benefits of depositor discipline, however, may be illusory. Risk policies
and personnel can be changed at any time, and contractual comndtments to avoid risk
would likely be cost inefficient for a bank to negotiate with each depositor and cost
inefficient for each depositor to enforce. This reality is highlighted by the fact that
brokered certificates of deposit ("CDs"), which are almost always large and uninsured, are
not purchased pursuant to any kind of contract containing commitments by the bank as to
activity or investment policies. Professor Garten points out that short-term debt like com-
mercial paper and CDs is not issued with covenants; the short-term nature of the instru-
ment provides the protection, along with an active secondary trading market. See Garten,
Still Banking on the Market, supra note 7, at 245-46.
Macey and Garrett also suggest that banks could contractually prevent bank runs by
limiting depositors' light to withdraw their monies on demand. See Macey & Garrett, Mar-
ket Discipline, supra note 80, at 231. Customers put much of their money in banks, however,
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C. Other Creditors
Having concluded that none of the other private-sector actors is
suitable, nondeposit creditors are the remaining potential source of
market discipline. There are two classes of non-deposit creditors that
may serve as market disciplinarians. The first class is comprised of
short-term creditors, such as interbank and corporate creditors that
supply funds, often on an overnight basis, to a bank. The second class
is comprised of long-term creditors, such as holders of bank-issued
debt securities.
1. Interbank and Other Short-Term Creditors
Interbank creditors are an intriguing, but ultimately unsatisfac-
tory, source of creditor discipline." To be certain, interbank credit
arrangements do provide banks with a reason to remain well-
capitalized. A bank transacts with a host of counterparties that may
not hold debt securities in the bank but, nevertheless, enter into con-
tracts with the bank. The value of these contracts is contingent on the
continued solvency of the bank. 87 A counterparty entering into, for
example, an interest rate swap with a bank becomes exposed to the
credit risk of the bank and hence, one would expect, will charge a
higher price to a bank that is in weak financial condition.
Interbank credit arrangements, however, are not good sources of
market discipline. To begin, most. interbank transactions are con-
ducted pursuant to standardized contracts," and counterparties have
little flexibility to impose special terms. In addition, because many
interbank contracts have special bankruptcy priority89 and are short-
for the sole purpose of having transaction accounts with complete liquidity. Moreover, to
the extent sonic►  depositors would permit time limits on their withdrawals for certain
higher-rate savings or money-market accounts, the time li ►its would be short—days or
weeks—thus only slightly delaying the prospects of a bank run.
86 See Oedel, supra note 5, at 402-09.
87 Interest rate swaps and securities repurchase agreements are examples. An interest
rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange over time interest cash flows,
based on a notional principal amount, calculated according to a fixed formula. See FED-
ERAL RESERVE TRADING AND CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL § 4325.1 (Feb. 1998).
For example, Bank A might agree to pay to Bank B annually 8% of $1 million, while Bank
B agrees to pay Bank A annually LIBOR plus 3% of $1 million. A repurchase agreement is
an agreement between two parties where one party agrees to sell a security to the other
party and agrees to repurchase the security from the other party at a fixed price at a
specific date in the future. See id. § 4015.1.
88 See id. § 4325.1.
49
 For example, the conservatorship and receivership provisions of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act provide for special treatment for "qualified financial contracts," which term
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term,90 bank counterparties have a reduced incentive to price con-
tracts according to the bank's credit risk or to engage in significant
monitoring of the bank's financial condition. For this reason, the
price one bank charges another for a swap or other interbank credit
arrangement is determined only in small part by the credit risk posed
by the borrower.91 Price signals, consequently, will be ambiguous and
will not provide regulators with much information about the bank's
risk posture.
2. Long-Term Creditors or Bondholders
Leaving interbank and other short-term creditors aside, we turn
to the last potential source for market discipline: the bondholder or
long-term creditor of a bank. In contrast to the other potential candi-
dates, these debtholders are well suited to act as disciplinarians.
Bondholders have interests that are closely aligned with those of gov-
ernment regulators, and they possess tools that enable them to moni-
tor bank conduct and cabin bank risk taking.
Although long-term debtholders, unlike holders of common
stock, are not entitled to elect their borrower's directors and do not
have voting power over all of a bank's significant policy decisions,
these debtholders routinely contract with their borrowers for at least
negative control, or veto power, over the significant corporate deci-
sions that might adversely affect the interests of the debtholders. For
example, bond indentures and loan agreements typically restrict a
borrower's ability to increase its leverage, enter new businesses, sell
significant assets or merge with other companies without the approval
of some proportion of the debtholders. Debtholders also frequently
negotiate informational covenants' pursuant to which borrowers agree
to furnish detailed annual, quarterly and even monthly financial and
other data to the debtholders. In addition, debtholders routinely sub-
includes securities, commodities and forwards contracts, and repurchase and swap agree-
mews. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (8) (1994).
90
 Eighty percent of repurchase agreements, for example, are overnight transactions.
See FEDERAL RESERVE TRADING AND CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL § 4015.1 (Feb.
1998).
91 The price of a securities repurchase agreement will for example. depend snore on
the nature of the securities subject to the agreement and the relevant collateral arrange.
ments than on the creditworthiness of the bank counterparty. Similarly, the price of a de-
rivatives contract will depend principally on the nature, value and volatility of the underly-
ing instrument.
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ject borrowers to minimum financial ratios 92
 These types of covenants
are precisely the kinds of provisions that are necessary to discipline
bank behavior.
The typical investment of a long-term debtholder is also much
larger than the typical investment of a depositor and, accordingly, we
should expect that the typical long-term creditor has a much greater
incentive to monitor a bank. Moreover, these nondeposit creditors are
almost uniformly institutional investors that possess the financial so-
phistication and business acumen necessary to monitor their borrow-
ers. Finally, because the typical debt investment is long term, most
debtholders cannot put their investment back to the bank in the same
manner that depositors can withdraw their funds.° Sudden, devastat-
ing bank runs will not be the market disciplinary mechanism em-
ployed by long-term debtholders."
1V. AN INSTRUMENT FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE: SUBORDINATED DEBT
In the previous Part, we determined that the market participant
that can provide the most effective market discipline of banks is the
non-depositor creditor that holds a long-term debt instrument issued
by the bank. This Part seeks to determine the debt instrument that
best enables such creditors to discipline banks. The task is to design a
capital-enhancing debt instrument, the holders of which would have
incentives most closely aligned with federal bank regulators. This Part
sets forth proposed terms for the instrument and analyzes which
banks ought to be required to issue such debt and how much and to
whom.
" The classic work on debtholder covenants and the economic theory behind them is
Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7. J. FIN. ECON.
117 (1979). Other works on debtholder covenants include BREALEY & MYERS, supra note
70, at 690-93; ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLE/N, DOCUMENTATION FOR LOANS, As-
SIGNMENTS & PARTICIPATIONS (3d ed. 1996); and Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986).
93
 Like equityholders, holders of a corporation's public debt generally have the right
and ability to sell their debt in the secondary market and, thus, express their views as to
the bank's riskiness.
94
 A well-established and reasonably liquid market for corporate subordinated debt se-
curities exists, but few banks have issued debt securities to third parties. See Meyer, Conf. on
Reform, supra note 4. As of June 30, 1999, subordinated notes and debentures represented
only 1.3% of the total liabilities of U.S. insured depository institutions. See FDIC, Statistics
on Banking Second Quarter 1999, Table RC-I, Assets and Liabilities of FDIC-Insured Commercial
Banks (visited April 3, 2000) Chttp://www. fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/9906/
cbrc01 .html>.
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A. Priority
The first question to address is the priority of the debt security in
the capital structure of the bank. As noted in the previous Part, the
goal is to find debtholders with incentives as similar as possible to
those of the federal government, as bank regulator, and to the FDIC,
the agency responsible for guaranteeing deposits and resolving failed
banks. Because the FDIC guarantees depositors, the debt instrument
should stand on an equal footing with the bank's insured depositors.
The relevant security, however, should also provide a capital cushion
to the bank that will absorb losses before the federal deposit insur-
ance fund incurs a loss. Hence, the debt must, at a maximum, have a
priority one stage below that of the bank's insured depositors. Balanc-
ing these two competing interests, it seems that the best place for the
debt security in the capital structure of the bank is in a tier of debt
immediately subordinated to the bank's depositors and general credi-
tors (including trade and interbank creditors) and immediately prior
to the remainder of the bank's debt. Holders of this debt would be
paid in a bank's insolvency only after depositors' and general credi-
tors' claims are fully satisfied, but before other creditors and equity-
holders receive money.
The implementation of this priority scheme may require a transi-
tion period. Some banks have debt outstanding, and requiring these
banks to issue a senior subordinated debt instrument may compel
them to violate certain covenants in their existing debt indentures or
loan agreements. Those banks able to redeem the existing problem-
atic debt without paying a substantial premium should be required to
do so; other banks may be permitted to issue junior subordinated
debt until such time as their existing problematic debt instruments
mature.
B. Maturity
The maturity of the debt instrument should be determined by
balancing two competing considerations. On the one hand, a debt
security with a long maturity is preferable. From a capital adequacy
perspective, only long-term debt contributes to a bank's capacity to
incur losses over a period of time and remain solvent 9 5 Short-term
g5 The Federal Reserve Board's Capital Guidelines permit bank holding companies
and state member banks to count debt in tier 2 capital if the debt has airoriginal weighted
average maturity of at least five years and is subordinated to general creditors and deposi-
tors. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 208 (1999) & 225 app. A, § IA.2.ci (1998). The Capital Guidelines
224	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:195
obligations 'do not provide much support to a bank in distress because
short-term creditors can withdraw their funds from the bank precisely
when the bank most needs them." Moreover, holders of long-term
debt securities would have incentives more closely aligned with those
of the government—ensuring the perpetual health of the bank—than
would holders of short-term debt securities. Accordingly, long-term
debt securities would provide more relevant pricing information to
regulators than would short-term securities."
There is, however, a countervailing consideration. Requiring a
firm repeatedly to issue short-term obligations has the potential
benefit of forcing the ,bank to access the capital markets more fre-
quently. As discussed above, a firm that knows it will have to raise capi-
tal frequently in the primary market will be more likely to behave ap-
propriately—in a fashion that will make prospective investors consider
the firm to be desirable."
In balancing these competing interests, we propose that Subject
Banks (as defined below) should be required to issue subordinated
debt securities with a minimum maturity of six years, and should be
required to roll over a proportionate amount of their subordinated
debt at least once every two years." Six-year debt should provide a
also require bank holding companies and banks to exclude from tier 2 capital 20% of the
principal amount of the debt in each of the security's last five years. See id. § 255 app. A,
§ IA.2.e. The requirements of the Capital Guidelines are set forth in infra note 109.
96
 As noted above, one of the superior characteristics of debtholder monitoring versus
depositor monitoring is that debtholders generally cannot make a run on the bank. See
supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
97
 The government, naturally, has an interest in preventing bank insolvency at all
times. A holder of a very long-term debt instrument (say, a 100-year bond) has a similar
interest because that creditor will only receive its principal i•estment back from the bank
if the institution remains solvent for the next 100 years. In addition, the price of the bank's
100-year debt security will reflect the market's assessment of the bank's risk of insolvency
prior to maturity of the bond (that is, for the full 100 years). The price of a long-term
bond will reflect its issuer's insolvency risk over a longer term than would a short-term
bond's price.
" See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
99
 Imposing a regulatory maximum maturity would not be beneficial. A bank theoreti-
cally could issue thirty-year debt securities, and thereby reduce its short-term exposure to
the discipline of the capital markets by reducing the amount of debt it would have to roll
over in the short-term. A bank issuing thirty-year debt would have to roll over one-fifteenth
of its subordinated debt every two years, whereas a bank issuing ten-yea• debt would have
to roll over one-fifth of its subordinated debt every two years. Moreover, by issuing fifteen
tranches of thirty-year debt, rather than five tranches of ten-year debt, a bank would be
permitted to count much more of its subordinated debt as tier 2 capital. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 208 (1999) & 225 app. A, §§IA.2.d& I.A.2.e (1998).
Despite these incentives, there are reasons to think that banks would not issue such
very long-term debt. Banks would find longer-term debt securities to be a more expensive
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sufficiently long-term investment to prevent runs on the bank's capital
and to align investors' interests with those of the government and the
long-term solvency of the bank.m
Although most of the currently outstanding subordinated debt
issued by U.S. banking organizations has a ten-year maturity, 101 banks
should be accorded as much flexibility as possible in determining the
tenor of their subordinated debt. Some banks will find that they can
issue six-year debt much more cheaply than ten-year debt; other banks
will find that ten-year debt, or debt of even a longer term, is the most
cost-effective approach for them. Under this proposal, banks would
be able to issue ten-year debt, the current market standard, or debt of
a shorter or longer term to meet their individual corporate finance
needs. This flexibility also will permit banks to adapt their capital
structures quickly to keep up with evolving market trends without hav-
ing to wait for regulators to recognize the evolution and react with
revised regulations.
Requiring banks to issue subordinated debt in staggered
tranches, at least once every two years, will provide substantial capital
markets discipline on bank behavior. A requirement to tap the capital
markets at least once every two years should not be too burden-
some—large bank holding companies typically issue subordinated
debt into the capital markets once or twice per year. 02 Providing
banks flexibility as to the frequency of their primary offerings would
allow banks to avoid having to issue debt in times of market stress and
to design a debt program that best suits their particular funding
needs.
form of financing. Investors require, ceteris paribus, a higher return to lock up their money
for a longer period. Investors also require, ceteris paribus, a higher return on small, less
liquid tranches of debt (which would be engendered by the longer-term debt approach).
Even if some banks were to issue thirty-year debt, it is not clear that the longer-term loss
absorption capacity of the debt and the longer-term incentive horizons of the holders of
the debt would not outweigh the costs of less frequent tappings of the capital markets. .
100
 A portion of this debt would count as tier 2 capital under the Capital Guidelines.
Assuming a bank issues six-year debt and rolls over one-third of its outstanding debt every
two years, inunedbtely prior to rolling over a tranche, the bank would be permitted to
count one-third of its outstanding subordinated debt as tier 2 capital; immediately after
rolling over a tranche, the bank would be permitted to count two-thirds of its outstanding
subordinated debt as tier 2 capital. See 12 C.F.R. § 208 app. A, § IIA2.e (1999). Assuming a
bank issues ten-year debt and rolls over 10% every year, the corresponding percentages
would be 70% immediately before rolling over a tranche and 80% immediately after roll-
ing over a tranche. See id.
101 See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64, at 34-35.
02 See id. at 46.
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One commentator has proposed that certain banks be required
to issue puttable subordinated debt.'" Under that scheme, large
banks would be required to have a minimum amount of subordinated
debt outstanding at all times, and banks would have to stand ready to
redeem at par value within ninety days any debt "put" to them by in-
vestors. If investor puts reduced a bank's outstanding subordinated
debt below the prescribed minimum, the bank would have to issue
additional subordinated debt, sell risky assets to reduce its minimum
debt requirements or face closure by regulators. 10"
This approach certainly would increase the amount of market
discipline to which banks are subject, but requiring banks to issue re-
deemable debt is not a workable proposal for many reasons. Foremost
among them is the threat of bank runs. Puttable subordinated debt
too closely resembles a demand deposit and, while holders of bank
subordinated debt will by and large be more sophisticated investors
than depositors, the creation of a tier of uninsured quasi-demand ob-
ligations places a bank's capital base at risk of rapid erosion.m Sec-
ond, it seems unlikely that a bank experiencing significant puts of its
subordinated debt would be able to replace potentially one-third to
one-half of its capital base on ninety days' notice. Issuing securities,
especially public securities to new investors, is typically a lengthy pro-
cess. Third, the puttable debt would need to be in the form of
floating-rate debt securities, 106
 and demandable floating-rate debt se-
curities are a rare financial instrument. When introducing a relatively
new type of security into the capital markets, such as bank subordi-
nated debt, it would be best to keep the novel elements to a mini-
mum. Fourth, a right to put a security back to the issuer at par en-
courages investors to exercise the put at the slightest sign of the
1°3 See Wall, supra note 6, at 9-11.
1°4 See id. at 4-6.
105 While investment professionals are less subject to irrational bandwagon behavior
than individual investors, no institutional investor wants to be one of the only debtholders
who failed to jump ship when all the other debtholders in a bank did jump. Moreover, the
prisoner's dilemma faced by the creditors of a bank approaching insolvency suggests that
even fully informed and rational creditors should exit at the first sign of trouble, even if
the sign of trouble is chimerical. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25. A run on a large
bank's puttable debt could have serious systemic repercussions. See Garten, Banking on the
Market, supra note 80, at 162-63; see also supra Part LB. (describing the systemic risks of
bank failures).
5°6 See Wall, supra note 6, at 3. The puttable debt would have to be floating-rate be-
cause investors would put puttable fixed-rate debt back to the issuers as soon as general
interest rates increased. See id.; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 360 (describing
the mechanics of floating rates).
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issuer's eroding financial condition. Why sell into the market at 95%
of par value, if the issuer stands ready to redeem at 100% of par value
at any time? 1°7 A ninety-day put waiting period will somewhat mitigate
the tendency to put at the first sign of trouble, but not enough. The
put mechanism will substantially eliminate the debt securities' ability
to convey pricing information to bank managers, the market and
regulators. Regulators, for example, will have little advance warning
of a bank's financial difficulties; rather, at the first sign of weakness, all
of the investors would rush to put their securities back to the bank.
C. Amount of Debt
We propose that each Subject Bank should be required to have
outstanding at all times an amount of subordinated debt equal to two
percent of the bank's risk-adjusted assets, as calculated under the
Capital. Guidelines applicable to such bank. 1°8 The Capital Guidelines
implicitly require banks to hold tier 2 capital against four percent of
their risk-adjusted assets. 1® The subordinated debt would count as tier
2 capital for a bank only to the extent currently permitted by the
Capital Guidelines.n°
We expect that most Subject Banks will use the new subordinated
debt to replace other outstanding securities counting as tier 2 capital.
Because the Capital Guidelines require banks to reduce proportion-
ally the amount of tier 2 capital credit received for subordinated debt
securities with less than five years remaining until maturity, our pro-
posal will require banks to operate with a slightly higher aggregate
107 Wall suggests that the bank could avoid this eventuality by originally issuing their
bonds at prices above par. See Wall, supra note 6, at 12. To the extent that banks are permit-
ted to issue their bonds at prices above par, banks themselves obtain control over how
much discipline the put mechanism will have.
108 Bank holding companies that have greater than $10 billion in assets and issue sub-
ordinated debt currently have subordinated debt outstanding equal to 2.9% of their risk-
weighted assests. See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64, at 27.
109 The Capital Guidelines require banks to hold tier 1 capital in an amount at least
equal to 4% of risk-adjusted assets and total capital (tier 1 plus tier 2 capital) in an amount
at least equal to 8% of risk-adjusted assets. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 208 app. A, § IV.A (2000) & 225
app. A, §1VA (1998).
no Evanoff advocated amending the Capital Guidelines to replace the 8% total capital
requirement with a 4% equity and 4% subordinated debt requirement. See Evanoff, supra
note 6, at 355-56. We see no reason to alter the Capital Guidelines to effect our proposal.
Moreover, adjusting the Capital Guidelines in such a fashion would be inconsistent with
the requirements of the Basle Capital Accord, which is an internationally agreed upon
framework for measuring the capital adequacy of banks. A U.S. departure from the Basle
standards would have adverse international repercussions.
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outstanding amount of capital securities."' This implicit raising of the
minimum capital requirements will increase a bank's cost of financing
and may reduce its return on equity. Of course, if bank subordinated
debt has the desirable effects laid out in this Article, regulators should
consider at a later date reducing the levels of required tier 2 capita1. 112
D. Issued at the Bank Level
Our proposal requires that banks, as opposed to their parent
holding companies, issue the minimum amount of subordinated
debt. 113
 This aspect of the proposal will help ensure that debtholders
are concerned solely with the safety and soundness of the debt-issuing
banks, rather than the well-being of banks' parent holding companies
or affiliates, and that debtholders' interests will be closely allied with
the interests of bank regulators." 4
Because the activities of banks would be the principal, if not ex-
clusive, source of funds for bank debt servicing, debtholders would
monitor the activities of banks and would discipline banks that seek to
engage in high-risk activities. The activities of a bank's affiliates or its
parent holding company would affect debtholders only to the extent
m As'discussed above, immediately prior to rolling over a tranche of ten-year subordi-
nated debt securities, a bank would only be permitted to count 70% of its subordinated
debt as tier 2 capital. See § 208 app. A, § IIA.2.e (1999). Consequently, a Subject Bank
would need to maintain additional permanent capital in an amount equal to 0.6% of its
risk-weighted assets if such bank intended to maintain its reported capital ratios. See id,
112 Argentina, the only country that requires its banks to issue subordinated debt, re-
quires banks to issue subordinated debt in an amount equal to 2% of their deposits. See
USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64, at 68. Although use of insured deposit de-
nominators rather than risk-based asset denominators may advance more precisely the
goal of minimizing losses to the insurance funds, the systemic risks posed by a banking
organization are more likely proportional to its risk-based assets than its deposit liabilities.
113 As of year-end 1984, bank holding companies issued more than ten times the
amount of debt issued by banks. See Robert B. Avery et al., Market Discipline in Regulating
Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets, 201 MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 597, 599
(1988). In contrast to our proposal, which focuses exclusively on bank-issued subordinated
debt, the subordinated debt study required by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act mandates that
the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department investigate the appropriateness of requiring
both large banks and their holding companies to issue subordinated debt. See Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,§ 108(a) (1), 113 Stat. 1338, 1361 (1999).
114 Most banks, and certainly all of the largest banks, are subsidiaries of holding cosh
panics. These holding companies may engage in a broad range of financial activities in
which their subsidiary banks may not directly engage. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (Supp. II 1996).
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has expanded the types of activities that holding companies
with "well-managed" and "well-capitalized" bank subsidiaries may engage. Such activities
include insurance and securities underwriting and other activities deemed "financial in
nature." See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 101-161.
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that those activities alter the bank's ability to service its subordinated
debt. Any inter-corporate transactions that are beneficial to the bank
should meet with debtholder approval. On the other hand, debthold-
ers, like government regulators, would guard vigilantly against any
attempts by a parent or an affiliate of a bank to divert resources from
the bank or to engage in transactions that are detrimental to the
bank. 115 This vigilance against inter-corporate transactions that are
disadvantageous to banks—yet beneficial to non-bank affiliates within
the same holding company—is especially vital in the post-financial
modernization world, where banks may freely affiliate with a wide va-
riety of other financial firms.
It is important that banks issue the required subordinated debt
because, as detailed in the first Part of this Article, it is banks—and
not their parent companies—that are special. After all, the goal of our
proposal is to give banks a private-sector constituency that is inter-
ested in banks—not the corporate owners of banks—and that helps
federal regulators safeguard banks. 116
Requiring the corporate owners of banks to issue subordinated
debt would not serve the goals of risk monitoring and disciplining at
the bank level. Indeed, the holders of parent-company debt may be
significantly insulated from risk taking at the subsidiary bank level by
the other varied businesses in which the parent company may engage.
This will be especially true in the wake of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, which authorizes the creation of broadly diversified financial en-
terprises. The banking operations of the new financial holding com-
panies may represent only a small part of the overall operations of the
enterprise, and subordinated debtholders of such a financial holding
company may have no need to be vigilant as to the activities of the
11-5
 inter-corporate transactions are a principal concern of bank regulators. Congress
and federal regulators have long feared that, especially in times of severe financial stress,
bank holding companies will be tempted to divert resources front banks to their nonbank-
ing affiliates. See, e.g., Gallen, Market Discipline Revisited, supra note 43, at 204-05; Satish M.
Rini, New Fed. Letter Eases Limits on Use of Affiliate Securities as Loans, BANKING POLY REP.,
May 17, 1999, at 12. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act seek to safeguard
against such conduct by imposing restrictions on transactions involving banks and their
affiliates. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (1994).
no Indeed, federal regulators' principal interest in the parent holding companies of
banks stems from how the activities of the parents may endanger their subsidiary banks. Cf.
HELLER & FEIN, supra note 49, § 17.01 (noting that, historically, regulation of bank holding
companies was alined at reducing concentration in the banking industry).
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firm's subsidiary banks so long as the other parts of the business are
managed prudently.""
Admittedly, requiring banks that are subsidiaries of parent hold-
ing companies to issue subordinated debt may create accounting and
disclosure issues for parent firms. For example, parent holding com-
panies may need to issue detailed public financial reports and break-
out operating results at the subsidiary bank level, practices with which
they may not be familiar and which may involve added expense.
Moreover, financial analysts and other market participants may, for
the first time, raise questions regarding a subsidiary bank's perform-
ance, rather than just the overall financial holding company's results.
Subsidiary banks also may need to be managed differently than
under current practice, with greater attention given to the legal entity
of the bank and how transactions affect the bank's subordinated deb-
tholders. Currently, most holding companies are operated as inte-
grated organizations that make use of centralized risk-management
systems.118
 That management system may need to be changed because
subordinated debtholders will place greater emphasis on the per-
formance and risks undertaken at the bank level. That change may
involve greater inefficiencies than a system that permits business-line
.management across the entire financial holding company, but that
change also may result in better firewalls between the bank and its
affiliates, in better corporate policies to safeguard against inter-
company transactions that adversely affect the bank, and in less risk
that a court might pierce the corporate veil and hold the bank liable
for an affiliate's debts or misconduct.
Although requiring banking organizations to issue debt at the
bank level may create the inefficiencies described in the preceding
paragraphs, those inefficiencies may be offset by the reduced costs of
bank-level issuance. Empirical evidence has shown that the market
requires a higher return on bank holding company subordinated
debt than bank subordinated debt." 9
 Accordingly, banking organiza-
117
 For example, one of the first true financial holding companies under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act is Citigroup. Citigroup engages in securities activities through Salomon
Smith Barney and a broad array of insurance activities through the former Travelers
Group of insurance companies. The bank assets of the firm represent approximately one-
third of the total assets of Citigroup. See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64, at 31.
118
 See Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 58, at 41.
119 See Julapa Jagtiani, George l►auftnan & Catharine Lemieux, Do Markets Discipline
Banks and Bank Holding Companies? Evidence from Debt Pricing, EMERGING Issues SERIES, FED.
BM BANK OF CHICAGO, Julie 1999, at 15. Because some empirical evidence also has
shown that the debt capital markets are equally able to perceive the riskiness of banks and
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Lions should be able to issue subordinated debt at the bank level more
cheaply than at the holding company level.
Finally, issuance of subordinated debt at the bank level will help
avoid corporate control issues that may arise if the debt were required
to be issued at the parent company level. Because, under this pro-
posal, the subordinated debt will be typically issued by a bank that is a
wholly owned subsidiary of a parent holding company, there is little
risk that the subordinated debt will be accumulated by a potential
corporate suitor as a means for acquiring the parent holding com-
pany. By contrast, there would be a greater risk that acquirers of debt
that is issued at the parent company level would seek to combine that
debt holding with other direct or indirect stake holdings in the parent
company in an attempt to exercise control or controlling influence
over that company. 120
E. Subject Banks
Our proposal divides banks into three tiers and imposes different
requirements on banks in each tier. The smallest banks ("Tier III
banks")—those with total consolidated assets less than $1 billion—
would not be compelled to issue subordinated debt but would be al-
lowed to opt-in to the system. Intermediate-size banks ("Tier II
banks")—those with total consolidated assets between $1 billion and
$10 billion—would be required to issue subordinated debt but would
be permitted to do so in a variety of manners. The largest banks
("Tier I banks")—those with total consolidated assets in excess of $10
billion—would have to issue subordinated debt in the form of securi-
ties registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). 121
We believe that thresholds based on asset size alone would be the
most practical. Our subordinated debt program is designed to mini-
bank holding companies, the price differential most likely arises from the federal subsidy
discussed supra Part I.C. See id.
r"0 determining whether one company has control over another for purposes of the
Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve has long considered not only the size of
the acquirer's equity stake but also the amount of subordinated debt held by that
stakeholder. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co., Order Approving Notice to Engage in Certain
Lending Activities, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 165, 16511.2 (1996).
121 Federal regulators should be authorized to develop an indexing mechanism to ad-
just over time the asset thresholds for each tier. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, § 121(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1373-81 (1999) (requiring the Federal Reserve
Board and the Treasury Department to establish jointly an indexing mechanism for adjust-
ing the $50 billion asset limit for financial subsidiaries of national banks).
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mize losses to the deposit insurance funds and to assist regulators in
managing systemic risk in the financial infrastructure of the United
States. Although certain non-size criteria, such as the geographic
scope of an institution or the nature and complexity of an institu-
tion's activities, are relevant to systemic risk assessment, we believe
that it is more important to provide banking organizations with clarity
as to the scope of application of the subordinated debt rules than to
pick up a handful of small organizations that pose an outsized risk to
the financial system. 122
 Requiring such small banks to issue debt secu-
rities would impose on them unacceptably high financing costs. 125
Holding companies with multiple bank subsidiaries would be re-
quired to aggregate the assets of all their banking affiliates to deter-
mine which tier their banks fall under. Additionally, the subsidiary
banks of a holding company would be required to issue, in the aggre-
gate, an amount of subordinated debt as if they were a single bank in
that tier. If a holding company determines that direct issuance of sub-
ordinated debt by multiple banks would be inefficient, the holding
company could merge its banks or the banks could collectively issue a
single pool of subordinated debt securities under the rules applicable
to that tier. 124
 The aggregation requirement would ensure that two
holding companies that control the same amount of banking assets
do not receive disparate treatment under our proposed rule. The re-
quirement also would ensure that holding companies do not maintain
separate banks merely to escape the subordinated debt requirement.
I. Tier III Banks
The proposal envisions excluding Tier III banks from the manda-
tory elements of the subordinated debt plan. 125 The legal, administra-
It is worth exploring, however, whether a subordinated debt requirement should be
imposed upon the subsidiary banks of a financial holding company that engages in mer-
chant banking, insurance underwriting or real estate investment and development. lik the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Congress recently expressed its view as to the riskiness of these
activities by forbidding them to national bank operating subsidiaries. See id. This sort of
unambiguous activity threshold would be clearly preferable to a threshold based on a regu-
latory determination of complexity or risk profile.
153 See infra text accompany notes 125-27.
124
 Such novel poolings are currently being explored by bank holding companies. See
generally John J. Madden, Financing Small Bank Holding Companies: Securitization of Capital
Securities, 54 Bus. LAW. 93 (1998).
125
 As of June 30, 1999, approximately 9800 banks fell within our Tier III category.
These banks had total consolidated assets of approximately $1.3 trillion, which represents
about 19% of the U.S. banking system's total assets. See FDIC, Statistics on Banking Second
Quarter; 1999, Table 104, Number and Total Assets of FDIC-Insured Depository Institutions (visited
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tive, disclosure and other fixed costs of issuing subordinated debt
would be excessive for the small banks in Tier III. In addition, if small
banks were made subject to this requirement, they would be required
to issue relatively small amounts Of debt. 126 The amount of the debt
issued may not be sufficient to draw adequate investor interest, and
small banks might have to pay a substantial interest-rate premium to
attract debtholders. Investors also might demand a rate premium
from Tier HI banks to compensate for the fixed costs of monitoring,
which would be relatively high compared to the small amount of debt
issued by such banks. 127
The exclusion of Tier III institutions is not problematic for our
proposal. Tier III banks, by and large, tend to engage in traditional
banking activities with which regulators have the greatest familiarity
and expertise. As a result, the marginal benefit of the additional
monitoring and discipline provided by private-sector creditors would
be negligible in the case of small, traditional banks. Moreover, and
perhaps more importantly, the failure of a Tier III bank would not
pose the same systemic risk to the economy or to the federal deposit
insurance fund as would the failure of a larger institution. Finally, the
proposal would permit Tier III banks to opt-in to the subordinated
debt scheme at their own discretion. 128
2. Tier II Banks
Banks with sufficient assets to place them in Tier II would be re-
quired to issue subordinated debt. Tier II institutions are large
enough to be able to absorb the costs of periodic debt issuance and to
April 4, 2000) <http://wwwfdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/0906/allstrultml >)
[hereinafter FDIC Statistics].
126 For example, a bank with $1 billion in total consolidated assets—the largest Tier III
bank—would be required to issue only approximately $20 million in subordinated debt.
Iv In advancing .a proposal for puttable subordinated debt, economist Larry Wail also
exempted small banks for many of the same reasons outlined above. See Wall, supra note 6,
at 4. Mr. Wall, however, noted that the expense to debtholders of monitoring small banks
could be reduced through the use of professional monitors, For example, he suggested
that private insurers could issue insurance contracts covering the debt and serve as dele-
gated monitors for investors. See id. at 5. It seems that such professional monitors would
face the same problem, however, in that they would receive a small fee for protecting the
interests of small debtholders.
128 Small banks may voluntarily choose to opt-in to the subordinated debt scheme if as
we propose below, they are subject to reduced government supervision and regulation and
have lower examination expenses upon issuing the required amount of debt or if their
corporate parents are permitted to engage in expanded activities once the bank has issued
the necessary debt. See infra Parts V.A. and V.E.
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issue debt without having to incur a sizable interest-rate premium.
Furthermore, the amount of debt issued by a Tier II bank would be of
sufficient quantity to attract investor interest. Tier II banks also are far
more likely than Tier III institutions to engage in non-traditional
financial activities, such that these institutions and their federal regu-
lators may benefit from the discipline of debtholders. Perhaps most
importantly, Tier II banks are of sufficient size that their failure may
have adverse systemic consequences. 129
Under our proposal, Tier II banks would be permitted to issue
unregistered debt securities through private placements.n° Although
Tier II banks are large enough to be required to issue subordinated
debt, the size of a Tier II bank's debt offering May not be sufficient to
require that the debt be issued in a registered public offering. 131
Moreover, a Tier II bank may not issue enough debt securities to fa-
cilitate the creation of a public market in the security.
Because of the lack of a public market for the Tier II banks' sub-
ordinated debt securities, the debt securities of Tier II banks likely
would be held principally by small numbers of sophisticated institu-
tional investors, such as pension and mutual funds and insurance
companies. These investors would possess the financial and business
acumen necessary to evaluate the risk posture of the banks. The debt-
holders also would have sufficient resources invested so that they will
have incentives to discipline bank managers and limit their risk-taking
activities. The investors may demand risk premiums to protect them-
selves from excessive risk taking on the part of a particular institution,
or the debtholders may negotiate ex ante restrictive covenants that im-
pose limits on bank activities. The existence of such premiums or
covenants should serve as important signals to federal regulators both
as to the private sector's evaluation of a particular bank's risk position
and a particular bank's willingness to limit its activities in response to
investor concerns.
129
 As of June 30, 1999, approximately 440 banks, with total consolidated assets of ap-
proximately $1.2 trillion, fell within our Tier II category. The assets of these banks repre-
sent about 18% of total U.S. banking assets. See FDIC Statistics, supra note 125.
130 For a complete description of the requirements of a valid private placement under
the Securities Act of 1933, see, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURI-
TIES LAWS § 6.2. (3d ed. 1996).
131 Companies generally find it difficult to raise less than a few hundred million dollars
in a public debt issuance. See, e.g., Laura Mandaro, Credit Suisse, B of A Eye Placing Tech Debt
Privately, AM. BANIMR, Nov. 10, 1999, at 5.
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3. Tier I Banks
Tier I banks are the largest banks in the country. 152 These institu-
tions and their parent holding companies are typically at the forefront
of financial modernization and change. Banks in Tier I engage in a
broad array of financial activities beyond the traditional banking func-
tions of taking deposits and making loans. As a result, these institu-
tions and their federal regulators would benefit most from private-
sector discipline. In addition, by virtue of being the nation's largest
banks, their failure poses the greatest risk to the financial system.
Under our proposal, Tier I institutions would be called upon to
issue subordinated debt to the public in offerings registered with the
SEC)" These Tier I banks and their bank holding companies already
issue a substantial amount of subOrdinated debt; consequently, transi-
tion costs for these banks should be low. 134
4. Transition Rules
A bank's asset size is subject to a fair amount of volatility. In order
to avoid logistical inefficiencies for a bank with an asset size that me-
anders around $1 billion or $10 billion, a bank with assets. that cross
the Tier I or Tier II thresholds from below should be permitted to
defer compliance with the subordinated debt requirements of the
new tier for a period of two years. Only banks with assets that ex-
ceeded $1 billion for eight straight quarters would be automatically
subject to the privately issued subordinated debt program; and only
banks with assets that exceeded $10 billion for eight consecutive guar-
132 As of June 30, 1999, ninety-four banks, with total consolidated assets of approxi-
mately $4.1 trillion, fell Within our Tier 1 category. The assets held by Tier I banks repre-
sent approximately 63% of all the assets held by banks in the United States. See FDIC Statis-
tics, supra note 125.
155 This aspect of the proposal mirrors, to some extent, the subordinated debt pro-
posal advanced by Douglas Evanoff. See Evanoff, supra note 6, at 357.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows national banks to engage in various non-banking
financial activities through subsidiaries. Under the Act. national banks may control such
subsidiaries only if they meet certain conditions. Among the conditions is a requirement
that if the national bank is one of the fifty largest banks in the United States, it must issue
long-term, unsecured debt rated in the top three investment grades; if the national bank is
between the 51st and 100th largest banks in. the United States, it must either have debt in
the top three investment grades or meet other criteria imposed by the Federal Reserve and
Treasury Department. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 121, 113 Stat.
1338, 1341-84 (1999).
154 The top fifty U.S. insured commercial banks already finance over 2% of their risk-
weighted assets with subordinated debt. Sec USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64. at
27. Most of this subordinated debt is held by the banks' holding companies. See id. at 30.
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ters would be automatically subject to the publicly issued subordi-
nated debt program. This transition rule would save banks from the
regulatory burden of moving in and out of the subordinated debt
program and would provide growing banks with a substantial period
of time to prepare for compliance with the program. Similarly, we
propose that a bank should only be allowed to escape the subordi-
nated debt requirements for a particular tier if its assets remain below
the tier's minimum thresholds for eight consecutive quarters. 155
F. Foreign Banks
The question arises as to how foreign banks with U.S. branches
and agencies should be treated and whether, these institutions also
should be required to issue subordinated debt in order to engage in
banking and non-banking businesses in this country. On the one•
hand, to the extent that the subordinated debt requirement is viewed
as an additional burden on U.S. banks, foreign banks that operate in
the United States may gain a competitive advantage over their U.S.
competitors if these foreign institutions do not need to comply with
the requirements of this proposal.
At the same time, however, imposing the subordinated debt pro-
gram on foreign banks raises several difficulties. To begin with, requir-
ing foreign banks operating in the United States to issue subordinated
debt would result in a U.S. capital requirement being imposed extra-
territorially on foreign-based institutions and would be contrary to
the internationally accepted policy of consolidated "home country"
supervision, in which a bank's home country takes the lead in setting
the capital and other standards that should apply to that institution.
The United States' imposition of a subordinated debt requirement on
foreign banks could effectively supersede capital benchmarks estab-
lished by the home country supervisors of those foreign banks and
would effectively require those foreign banks to manage their interna-
tional operations to conform to the U.S. subordinated debt require-
ments. Were each host country to follow the United States' precedent
and to adopt similar unique capital requirements, internationally ac-
tive banks could be subject to an array of conflicting and possibly ir-
reconcilable standards. In addition, imposing the subordinated debt
requirements on foreign banks may be impractical given differences
"5 For another federal financial institution transition rule, see generally 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203A-1 (1999)(establishing transition rules for investment advisers who cross the
$25 million asset threshold and thus become subject to SEC registration requirements).
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in bank accounting practices, balance sheet structures and bank and
capital market regulation in different countries. 136 Perhaps most im-
portantly, few foreign banks with U.S. branches and agencies hold
deposits that are insured by the U.S. government.'" For this reason,
the failure of a foreign bank does not expose a U.S. federal taxpayer
to the same potential liability as the failure of a U.S. bank, and the
government does not have the same interest in constraining a foreign
bank's risk as the government has in keeping a domestic institution's
risk profile in check.'"
In any event, the imposition of a subordinated debt requirement
on U.S. banks, and not on foreign banks operating in the United
States, should not give rise to significant competitive inequities. As
discussed in greater detail in the next Part, U.S. banks that issue sub-
ordinated debt under our proposal will benefit from fewer examina-
tions and less general regulatory oversight. Foreign banks, by contrast,
would not be eligible to take advantage of these benefits. In addition,
to the extent that a subordinated debt program is successful in the
"6 United States regulators have long recognized these differences and have not re-
quired foreign banks active in the United States to comply with all of the capital require-
ments that apply to domestic banking institutions. For example, nearly a decade ago, the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department expressly rejected applying to foreign banks
active in the United States a leverage ratio" (a ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets), such as
the one that applies to U.S. banks and bank holding companies. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF FED. RES. S'sT. AND SECRETARY OF DEPT. OF TREAS.. CAPITAL EQUIVALENCY REPORT 41
( June 19, 1992) (noting that different standards are necessary to "accommodate[] the
significant differences in asset structures of banks from different countries and take]] into
account off-balance sheet activities"),
More recently, the Federal Reserve has departed from this precedent and has pro-
posed a leverage requirement for foreign banks that have U.S. branches or agencies that
wish to engage in expanded financial activities in the United States under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act. Nevertheless, that leverage requirement would still be more lenient than
the requirement that applies to U.S. banking firms. See Bank Holding Companies and
Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 3785, 3785 (2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 225). European Commission officials have raised the possibility of taking action against
the United States in the World Trade Organization to protest the Federal Reserve's impo-
sition of U.S. capital standards abroad. See Rob Garver, Foreign Banks Say U.S. Reforms Leave
Them at a Disadvantage, AM. BANKER, Mar. 16, 2000. at 1.
I57 of June 1999, only twenty-two U.S. branches of foreign banks held FDIC-Insured
deposits, totaling approximately $3 billion. That stun represents less than 1% of the $3.7
trillion of total federally insured deposits. See FDIC, Deposits of all FDIC-Insured Institutions
(visited April 3, 2000)‹http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/newtablelframe_main.cfm > (using
June 30, 1999 in date field). In addition, foreign bank branches in the United States are
limited in their ability to accept retail deposits. See 12 U.S.C. § 3104 (1994).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38 on why we regulate banks. Of course, for-
eign bank failures could pose systemic risks to the United States, but these systemic risks
are nearly identical to the risks posed by non-bank financial intermediaries, which also are
not subject to a subordinated debt requirement.
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United States, it may also be implemented internationally as part of
the Basle Capital Accord, in which case all banks—both U.S. and for-
eign—will be subject to similar subordinated debt requirements. 139
G. Insiders
Our proposal mandates that the subordinated debt be issued to
investors that are different from and independent of the managers
and equityholders of the bank, its affiliates or its parent holding coin-
pany."0
 In addition, our proposal requires that debtholders not have
significant business relationships with the debt-issuing bank or its
affiliates.t"t Subordinated debt held by such insiders of a bank or its
affiliates would not be counted towards the amount of subordinated
debt required to be issued by the bank.
This aspect of the proposal seeks to ensure that subordinated
debtholders do not have relationships with the bank that would com-
promise their willingness and ability to monitor and, where necessary,
impose limits on the activities of debt-issuing banks. Our concern is
that if, for example, an insurance company not only held the bank's
subordinated debt but also sold a significant volume of its insurance
policies to the bank's customers and obtained credit through the
bank, that insurance company may have priorities and goals that
conflict with its role as private-sector monitor of the bank's activities.
The insurer may be willing to purchase and hold the bank's subordi-
nated debt not because the bank's subordinated debt securities are an
attractive investment for the insurer but because ownership of the se-
curities may be a means to protect the insurer's business relationships
with the bank.
139
 To this end, one of the "three pillars" of the new capital framework proposed by the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is market discipline. See Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, A New Capital Adequacy Framewcnit: Pillar 3 Market Discipline (visited
April 3, 2000) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs65.hun > (consultative paper). The other
two pillars are minimum capital requirements and supervisory review processes. See id.
140 Larry Wall recognized similar concerns and proposed, as well, that bank insiders be
permitted to purchase only limited quantities of the bank's subordinated debt. See Wall,
supra note 6, at 8.
By insiders we mean to include any shareholder of the bank or affiliate that owns or
controls more than 5% of any class of voting securities of the bank or affiliate. Such a 5%
threshold corresponds with the threshold contained in the reporting requirement of sec-
tions 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d) &
78in (g), and therefore should be relatively easy for publicly owned bank holding compa-
nies and regulators to monitor.
141 Regulations would be required to determine what constitutes a business relation-
ship of sufficient significance to require the exclusion of the debtholder,
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This restriction will necessitate regulatory monitoring in order to
be successful. Bank examiners may need to review bank subordinated
debt periodically to ensure that outstanding debt is actually held by
independent investors. Regulators also may need to craft special rules
or give heightened supervisory scrutiny to banks that have issued the
required amount of subordinated debt to third parties but have also
issued a substantial amount of such debt to insiders and affiliates. Ne-
gotiation of the terms of the debt and decisions about enforcement of
these terms may be affected by the presence of bank insiders and
affiliates in the class of investors. The quality of pricing information
conveyed by the secondary market for the debt may also be weakened
if a substantial proportion of the debtholders are related to the bank
in ways other than as debt investors.
FI. Federal Administration
A single federal financial regulatory agency could be entrusted to
administer and ensure uniform compliance with the subordinated
debt program. A natural choice for this duty would be the FDIC,
which is the only federal banking agency that has a role in supervising
all banks, whether state or federally chartered. 142 The FDIC's princi-
pal mission is to maintain public confidence in the banking system,
and the agency is specifically entrusted with preserving the safety and
soundness of the federal deposit insurance fund—the very goal of our
proposal. 143 For these reasons, the FDIC has a direct stake in keeping
bank risk under control, and the FDIC's interests and those of subor-
dinated debtholders are closely matched.
If the FDIC were chosen as the administrator of the subordinated
debt program, banks required to—or, in the case of Tier III institu-
tions, that choose to—issue subordinated debt would be required to
report annually to the FDIC and to certify that they have issued the
142 The FDIC is the primary federal supervisor of state banks that are not members of
the Federal Reserve System and, because of its role in running the federal deposit insur-
ance program, it is the backup supervisor over all federally insured depository institutions.
See, e.g., Christian A. Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National Banks—The Renascence
of State Banking Powers, 26 LOYOLA limy. Cmcaco L. REV. 351, 360 (1995).
l 4lBy contrast, the OCC is charged with supervising national banks, and it often sees its
mission as promoting the national bank charter over state bank charters. See, e.g., Johnson,
supra note 142, at 363-65; see also Rob Garver, Visit from Hawke Kept 'National' in Bank's
Name, AM. BANKER, Feb. 11, 2000, at 1 (detailing the efforts of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rem icy to keep a national bank from switching to a state charter), The Federal Reserve is
principally responsible for supervising at the holding company level and its role often puts
its interests at odds with those of the OCC. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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required amount of debt to non-insiders. Banks also would be re-
quired to reveal the pertinent terms of their subordinated debt con-
tracts. The FDIC's principal obligations would be to review these
submissions to ensure compliance with the requirements of the pro-
gram and to watch for signals from the market as to the risk posture
of the issuing banks. In the ordinary course, the FDIC's role should
not result in an added level of day-to-day oversight of banks or give
rise to significant added compliance burdens to subordinated debt
issuers. 144
 The FDIC, however, would have the residual authority—
such as the authority it currently possesses by virtue of its
administration of the federal deposit insurance fund—to inquire of
and to conduct on-site examinations for compliance in situations in
which bank submissions prove insufficient, unclear or otherwise
inadequate. The FDIC also would have the power to sanction or levy
fines against banks that fail to meet their subordinated debt
obligations."5
 In addition, the FDIC would be empowered to conduct
examinations if market signals or subordinated debt contract terms
indicate that the issuing bank was engaged in risky activities.
Entrusting all of the administrative and monitoring duties of the
subordinated debt program to the FDIC, however, could be problem-
atic. For example, the primary federal regulator of each issuing bank
currently has responsibility for the capital adequacy of that bank, and
it would be natural for that regulator to play a leading role in deter-
mining whether the bank's subordinated debt issuance was adequate.
In addition, a bank's primary federal regulator is the agency most fa-
miliar with the issuing bank and would be in the best position to un-
derstand the various market signals provided by subordinated deb-
tholders regarding the risk profile of that bank.
I. Other Considerations
Forcing financial institutions to alter their capital structure will
have secondary effects. For example, requiring certain banks to issue
debt (in replacement of equity or as a supplement to existing equity)
may reduce the value of their enterprises and will certainly raise the
144 See infra Part V.A. regarding how this system should actually reduce regulatory bur-
den.
145
 The FDIC possesses similar authority to take actions against banks and their man-
agers when they are engaged in unsafe and unsound banking practices that place the fed-
eral deposit insurance funds at risk. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1994).
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financing costs of those banks. 146 In addition, compelling a bank to
issue debt and to increase its leverage may increase the bank's ex-
pected costs of financial distress by an amount greater than the ex-
pected benefits of the debt. Banks are by their nature highly lever-
aged companies—deposits are a form of leverage—and forcing them
to obtain still more leverage may have high costs. These costs may
outweigh the advantages conferred by increased discipline. We cannot
say outright, however, that our proposal would impose inefficiencies
in capital financing decisions simply because banks are not currently
issuing the debt that the proposal would require. The Capital Guide-
lines already distort bank capital structures in an anti-debt direction;
it is possible that our rule would restore banks' capital structures to
optimal levels.
At least one commentator has indicated a preference for stan-
dardized terms if banks are to be required to issue subordinated
debt. 147 Regulators could require all banks to issue subordinated debt
of the same maturity, with the same frequency, and pursuant to debt
contracts that contain the same set of covenants and conditions. We
believe, however, that banks should be granted the maximum amount
of flexibility possible in designing and issuing their subordinated debt
consistent with achieving the regulatory goals of increasing market
discipline and market signaling to regulators. The most obvious
benefit of standardization is that it would provide regulators with sig-
nals that are more comparable across different banking organizations.
This benefit is outweighed by numerous costs, many of which have
been mentioned above. Investors in bank subordinated debt will value
highly an ability to tailor covenants to the particular bank, and regula-
tors will be able to obtain a great deal of relevant information about a
bank's risks by evaluating these covenants. Furthermore, banks will
value an ability to negotiate covenants in, and determine maturities
of, their debt instruments.
Some commentators have proposed establishing a maximum in-
terest rate on a bank's subordinated debt securities. Imposing such a
cap on bank subordinated debt would be counterproductive. Deter-
mining the appropriate cap would be an insurmountable task; the cap
would need to be raised or lowered continually to reflect the existing
146
 The value of a leveraged firm is generally equal to the sum of three elements: (i)
the value of the firm if financed completely with equity; (ii) the present value of the tax
benefit of the firm's debt; and (iii) the present value of the costs of financial distress posed
by the firm's debt. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 485.
147 See Meyer, Conf. on Reform, supra note 4.
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interest rate environment; and a uniform cap would treat different
banking organizations with different capital structures unevenly. Simi-
larly, banks should be free to issue fixed or floating-rate securities.
Most U.S. banks and bank holding companies that currently issue
subordinated debt issue fixed-rate securities." 8
 The capital markets,
however, are sophisticated enough to price floating-rate debt as accu-
rately as fixed-rate debt, and banks' flotation of both fixed- and
floating-rate debt should not hinder greatly regulators from making
peer group comparisons.' 49
The one requirement that we would place on a bank's subordi-
nated debt is that it not be puttable at the option of the holder, for all
the reasons set forth above. Banks should be free, on the other hand,
to make the debt callable at the option of the bank at any time. Al-
though, to be consistent with the Capital Guidelines, the bank should
be required to consult with its appropriate federal banking agency
prior to redeeming any such debt. 15°
V. COLLATERAL BENEFITS
Requiring banks to issue subordinated debt securities would im-
prove the stability and soundness of the banking system by comple-
menting federal regulators' efforts to place limits on banks' risk-
taking activities. As this Article has detailed, subordinated debt-based
market discipline would be an important complement to the existing
scheme of bank regulation and supervision. Our proposal also would
have other important collateral benefits. In addition to contributing
meaningfully to risk monitoring, our proposal should lead to reduced
frequency and cost of bank examination while simultaneously en-
hancing examination efficiency; increased disclosure of bank activi-
ties; an efficient set of restrictions regarding the proper scope of bank
product diversification; and other collateral benefits.
A. Examination Frequency, Efficiency and Cost
A significant benefit of this proposal is that it would permit less
frequent examinations of banks by federal regulators, while facilitat-
148
 See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note 64, at 35.
149 Participants in the existing market for bank and bank holding company subordi-
nated debt have indicated that the lack of standardization across such debt instruments
does not make it difficult to compare the credit quality of various issuers within a peer
group. See id. at 45.
150 See, e.g.. 12 C.F.R. § 208, app. A, § II. (2000).
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ing better assessments of the risk posture of institutions.m By relying
on signals from subordinated debtholders, regulators would be able
to monitor the well-being of an institution without engaging in a di-
rect examination. 152 For example, regulators would have an indication
of private-sector concerns about an institution if holders of subordi-
nated debt began demanding a premium from a Tier I bank that was
seeking to roll over its maturing debt securities or if a variance
emerged between the secondary market price of subordinated debt
securities issued by an institution and its peer group. Similarly, the
imposition by subordinated debtholders of certain contractual cove-
nants on a bank might indicate a particular set of risks that ought to
concern regulators. The unwillingness of bank management to enter
into certain covenants agreed to by other banking peers also may be
an important indicator of a bank's risk policies. By use of such market
signals, regulators would not need to conduct full-scale on-site exami-
nations with their current degree of frequency; rather, examinations
could be more precisely and effectively targeted. Regulatory scrutiny
could be directed at the particular institutions that the private sector
signaled as raising concerns. When covenants indicate that particular
activities are of greatest concern, regulators may direct attention to
those bank activities. 153
Reducing the frequency of bank examinations would reduce the
monitoring and administrative costs of federal regulators, ease the
regulatory burden on banks, and result in lower examination fees. 154
These lower examination burdens and fees may be sufficient to entice
Tier III banks—which, as noted in Part IV above, would not be re-
quired to issue subordinated debt securities—to opt-in to the subor-
dinated debt program. These small banks may find that the cost of
151 In general, national and state banks must be examined every twelve mouths. See,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d) (1) (1994). For example, in some cases banks may be examined
on an eighteen-month cycle. See id. § 1820(d) (4).
152 Each federal bank regulatory agency is authorized to conduct a "thorough exami-
nation of the affairs" of a bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1994). The size and scope of the ex-
amination depends on a variety of factors, including the regulatory agency conducting the
examination and the size, activities and reputation of the bank to be examined. Examina-
tions focus on the capital adequacy, asset quality, management ability, earnings and liquid-
ity of a bank. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline:
The Role of Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (1986).
155
 This is not to imply that regulators would abandon traditional bank examinations.
On occasion, but with less frequency than is currently the case, regulators would conduct a
full-scope examination of an institution.
154 The cost of regular federal bank examinations is assessed against the examined
bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1820(e) (1) (1994).
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issuing subordinated debt is less than the cost of the current stricter
examination procedures.
B. Risk Premiums
This proposal also would enable the FDIC to establish more
quantitatively precise risk premiums for federal deposit insurance.
Since the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act ("FDICIA") in 1991, the FDIC has been required to
operate a risk-based assessment system for insured depository institu-
tions.155
 The FDIC's current system determines a bank's insurance
premium based on the bank's reported capital ratios and a subjective
assessment of the bank's financial soundness. 156 The FDIC could use
the pricing mechanism created by bank subordinated debt to assist it
in its efforts to price banks' deposit insurance premiums. Rather than
rely on publicly reported capital ratios (which are increasingly subject
to regulatory capital arbitrage) and supervisory assessments of
financial soundness (which are highly subjective), insurance premi-
ums could be calculated based in part on debt ratings or the market
prices of the subordinated debt issued by banks under this proposal.
Increasing the objectivity of the data used by the FDIC to determine
insurance assessments will enable the FDIC to be both aggressive and
fair in imposing insurance fees on banks.
In addition, this proposal would provide federal bank regulators
with credible market signals of the deteriorating financial condition
of a bank. As a bank deteriorates, the price of the bank's subordinated
debt securities will fall, and the implicit yield on the bank's debt will
rise. Bank regulators will easily be able to monitor these prices and
could impose restrictions on banks with falling debt prices similar to
those dictated by the prompt corrective action rules—restrictions on
payment of dividends, acquisition of assets and engagement in new
lines of business. 157 Because different banks have different capital
structures and will have subordinated debt securities with different
terms, regulators monitoring bank debt prices will not be able to use
uniform thresholds, like those used in prompt corrective action, to
155 See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1)(A) (1994). FDICIA defines a risk-based assessment sys-
tem as one in which the depository institution's insurance assessments are calculated on
the basis of (i) the probability that the deposit insurance fund will incur a loss with respect
to the institution; (ii) the likely amount of the loss if it occurs; and (iii) the revenue needs
of the deposit insurance funds. See id. § 1817(b) (1) (C).
156 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 327.4, 327.9 (1999).
157 See 12 U.S.C. § 18310 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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trigger sets of restrictions. Rather, regulators will be able to make
rough interbank comparisons (between banks) and fairly precise in-
trabank, intertemporal comparisons (a single bank over time).
C. Transparency
Another significant collateral benefit of our proposed system of
subordinated debt would be to increase the amount and quality of
financial information provided by banks and bank holding compa-
nies. At the present time, banks, especially banks that are wholly
owned subsidiaries of parent holding companies, lack incentives to
disclose financial information to the public. Under a system of market
discipline, however, banks will have strong incentives to report timely,
relevant financial information or face the prospect of being punished
by a market that does not adequately comprehend the institution's
risk profile. Increased public disclosure about bank operations will
improve the ability of market participants to distinguish strong banks
from weak banks158 and also will provide regulators with another im-
portant source of information for their own assessment of bank op-
erations and risks.159 In addition, market participants likely will be
most interested in the types of transactions that expose banks to the
greatest risks, including bank derivative activities. 16° These also are the
precise transactions in which regulators have the greatest interest.
D. Regulatory Arbitrage
A further benefit of our proposal may be to decrease opportuni-
ties for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage and to prevent com-
petition among various bank regulatory agencies from becoming a
"race to the bottom." The U.S. bank regulatory system does not vest
supervisory authority over banks and banking organizations with a
single regulator; rather, supervisory authority over banking firms is
divided among several competing regulatory agencies. Banks may
choose to be state or federally chartered. State-chartered institutions
158 See Fed. Res. Gov. Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.. Remarks at the College of Management,
Univ. of Mass. (Oct. 27, 1998) (available at The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve
Board Speech from 20/27/98 (visited February 22, 2000) <http:// www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1998/19981027.html>); infra Part VIA
159 See Ferguson, supra note 158. To this end, it is worth noting that the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act requires Federal Reserve examiners to make increased use of publicly available
information. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-103, § 111, 113 Stat. 1338,
1362-66 (1999).
160 See CALAMIRIS & MAN, supra note 84, at 43-44.
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are principally regulated and supervised by state banking commis-
sioners; federally chartered banks are regulated and supervised by the
OCC, a division of the Treasury Department. 161
 Meanwhile, the Fed-
eral Reserve regulates bank holding companies and the nonbanking
affiliates of banks. 162
This division of authority allows banking firms to choose to struc-
ture their operations so that they fall within the purview of the regula-
tor that the organization believes may be the most accommodating. 10
For example, a bank holding company that owns both state-chartered
and OCC-chartered banks can determine to engage in an activity
(e.g., municipal bond underwriting) in its state bank or through a
subsidiary of the state bank, both of which would be regulated princi-
pally by its state chartering authority; in its national bank or a subsidi-
ary of the national bank, which are regulated by the OCC; or at the
holding company level, regulated by the Federal Reserve. Giving
regulated entities such choices leads to competition among the regu-
lators, as each seeks to enhance the scope of its authority and the
number of institutions and activities that it oversees. 161
1" See Murray A. Indick Satish M. Kini, The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act: New Options, New Problems, 112 BANKING L.J. 100, 102 (1995). All federally insured
banks also are subject to supervision by the FDIC. In addition, state banks that are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System are subject to Federal Reserve examination and super-
vision. For a discussion of the complex system of overlapping jurisdictions of federal and
state bank regulatory authorities, see supra note 52 and sources cited therein.
162
 This complex scheme of shared regulatory authority has historical roots that date
back to the Civil War. See Charlotte L. Tart, Comment, Expansion of the Banking Industry
Under the Riegl•Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Is the Banking In-
dustry Headed in the Right Direction?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 919-23 (1995); Fed. Res.
Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks before the Annual Meeting and Conf. of State Bank
Supervisors (May 2, 1998) (available at The Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Board
Speech from 05/02/98 (visited Feb. 22, 2000) Clittp://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1998/19980502.huni>). The virtues and vices of this system have been the sub-
ject of much academic debate. See generally Johnson, supra note 142; Geoffrey P. hillier, The
Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. RENT. 1 (1987); Arthur E. Wihnarth, Jr., The
Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Bank-
ing System, 58 FORDIIAM L. REv. 1133 (1990).
163
 Banks may switch charters for other reasons as well, including lower examination
fees and easier access to regulators: In 1999, twenty state banks switched to federal char-
ters; twenty-two national banks switched to state charters. See Alan Kline, Bank in Memphis
Plans to Switch to State Charter; Am. BANKER, Dec. 30, 1999, at 2.
164
 Regulatory competition and turf fights between the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury Department hindered congressional financial modernization efforts. The Fed-
eral Reserve sought to have new financial activities conducted exclusively in holding com-
pany affiliates, whereas the Treasury Department (on behalf of the OCC) argued that new
financial activities should be permitted for banks and bank subsidiaries. See, e.g., Laura J.
Cox, Note, The Impact of the Citicorp-Thavelers Group Merger on Financial Modernization and the
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Such agency turf battles, however, can also create undesirable
regulatory risks.'" For example, regulators may ignore the risks asso-
ciated with an activity and may fail to penalize excessive risk taking for
fear that such action will lead a bank to switch charters or to house
that activity in an entity that is supervised by a competing agency.
Subordinated debtholders will serve as an important check on this
form of regulatory arbitrage. Debtholders will have a vital interest in
preventing excessively risky activities from being conducted in a bank
in which they have invested, and they will penalize banks, through the
various mechanisms outlined above, that seek to take advantage of
excessively permissive regulatory authority. 166 Unlike bank regulators,
subordinated debtholders will have no competing pressures that will
dampen their ability and interest in safekeeping the bank's assets. 167
E. Opportunities for Further Financial Modernization
Finally, our subordinated debt proposal may lay the groundwork
for further financial modernization—namely, authorization of the
mixture of banking and commerce through the holding company
structure.'" As a general matter, U.S. law has both barred banks from
affiliating with firms that are engaged in commercial or non-financial
businesses and prevented banks from engaging directly in commercial
activities.'" The twin separations of banking and commerce have
Repeal of Glass-Steagall, 23 Nova L. Rev. 899, 920-21 (1999). The compromise crafted by
Congress in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows most (but not all) financial activities to be
conducted at either the holding company or bank subsidiary level. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, §§ 101-161, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341-84 (1999).
165 There are powerful arguments that the benefits of regulatory competition out-
weigh the risks. For example, vesting all regulatory power with a single regulator could
lead to ossification and the stifling of change, which is particularly important in the dy-
namic financial services industry. See CALAMIRIS & LIMN, supra note 84, at 25.
16° This argument has also been advanced by CALAMIRIS & LITAN, supra note 84, at 25—
26.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55 regarding the singleness of purpose of in-
vestors, as opposed to government regulators.
169 Although Congress has just passed the Grano-Leach-Bliley Act, at least some policy
makers believe that further liberalization of restrictions in the financial services industry is
warranted. See, e.g., Anason, supra note 11, at 1 (noting Senate Banking Committee Chair-
man Gramm's appetite for further reform).
169 The history and merits of the separation of banking and commerce have been the
subject of much academic writing. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act:
Has It Lived Its Life?, 38 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1, 34-86 (1993); Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory
Separation of Banking from Securities and Commerce in the Modern Financial Marketplace, 33 ARIZ.
L. REV. 583, 617-27 (1991); Carter H. Golembe, Separation of Banking and Commerce: A Myth
that's Ripe for Debate, BANKING P01:1' REP., Jan. 20, 1997, at 12-17.
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been maintained for several reasons. Banks have been prevented from
affiliating with commercial firms because such banks may face
conflicts of interest when they engage in lending activities. Banks may
experience irresistible pressures from their commercial affiliates to
extend credit, and otherwise lend support, to those enterprises or to
withhold credit from :their competitors. Banks have been prevented
from engaging directly in commercial activities because such activities
may pose risks to the safety of the bank. Commercial activities are
viewed as inherently more volatile than traditional lending and de-
posit-taking activities, and are seen as likely to tax the ability of
financial regulators to comprehend their supervisory charges.'"
To the extent that these concerns are warranted, and there is
significant debate as to whether they are, our subordinated debt pro-
posal may represent a vehicle that can be used to permit the mixture
of banking and commerce, either through affiliation or within a uni-
versal bank.• For example, once a bank has issued the required
amount of subordinated debt (or perhaps some additional amount of
subordinated debt to be determined by federal regulators), it could
be free to affiliate with commercial enterprises. Whatever risks to the
bank arise from its commercial affiliations would be counter-balanced
by the monitoring role of the subordinated debtholders. In short, the
bank would have a private-sector constituency that would help federal
regulators to police transactions between the bank and its commercial
affiliates. If the private sector deemed a particular affiliation between
a bank and a commercial firm to expose the bank to undue risks or
exploitation, the bank's subordinated debtholders would demand a
risk premium from the bank or would negotiate covenants that would
restrict the nature and extent of the transactions between the bank
and that affiliate. Similarly, to the extent that a bank engages directly
in risky commercial activities, subordinated debtholders would re-
quire a higher interest rate, insist upon restrictive covenants, deny
credit or sell their debt into the market.
170 See, e.g., Felsenfeld, supra note 169, at 35-52; Mattingly & Fallon, supra note 58, at
32. Undue concentration of resources is another common concern voiced by opponents of
mixing banking and commerce. Admittedly, to the extent that this mixture would have
adverse macroeconomic or antitrust repercussions, a subordinated debt requirement does
not address all of the problems of combining banks with nonfinancial businesses.
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VI. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO OUR MARKET DISCIPLINE APPROACH
As stated in the Introduction, this Article is not written upon a
clean slate. Numerous commentators have registered opposition to
market discipline approaches to bank regulation on various grounds.
This Part examines some of the most common and powerful objec-
tions to market-based proposals and attempts to explain how these
objections can be overcome. Although none of the criticisms are fatal
to the market disciplinary project, a discussion of their strengths and
weaknesses provides valuable insight into the limits of market disci-
pline.
A. Investors Lack Adequate Information to Support a Market Discipline
Approach
The objection: Market discipline can only be an effective comple-
ment or supplement to bank regulation if market participants have
timely access to comprehensive and credible information about bank
assets and activities. Investors simply do not have a sufficient quantity
or quality of information about banks.
The response: Some theory and evidence suggest that market par-
ticipants have less (and less reliable) information about banks than
they do about other kinds of firms. The theoretical argument gener-
ally runs as follows: banks hold few fixed and easily valued assets and
the risks to banks' mostly financial , assets are hard to observe and easy
for banks to change."' The primary assets of most banks are loans to
private-sector borrowers. The value of each loan in a bank's portfolio
is hard to observe and is contingent on the terms of the loan contract
and the health and riskiness of the borrower. 172 The loan portfolio of
171 See generali5, Donald P. Morgan, Judging the Risk of Banks: 117zat Makes Banks Opaque?
(Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Research Paper No. 9805, 1998) (available at Federal Reserve Bank
of New fork, Federal Reserve Bank of New link—Research Papers (visited March 19, 2000)
Chttp://www.nyfrb.org/rmaghome/rsch_pap/9805.htud >); Manuel A. Utset, The Disci-
pline of Institutions and the Disciplining of Banks. 14 ANN. Rev. OF BANKING L. 211, 215-17
(1995). Professor Utset contends that bank opacity also stems from structural contingen-
cies—for example, that banks are generally controlled by bank holding companies, which
can shift assets and liabilities in and out of their bank subsidiaries in order to subsidize the
operations of their nonbank subsidiariei. See Utset, supra at 215-17. Federal banking law,
however, places substantial restrictions on these sorts of asset and liability transfers. See 12
U.S.C. § 371c (1994) (limiting the aggregate amount of a bank's loans to, investments in
and asset purchases from affiliates); § 37k-1 (requiring generally that a bank's transac-
tions with affiliates be on fair market terms).
112 One study found that loan quality problems developed over a period of three to
five years before market observers could see them. See Richard E. Randall, Can the Market
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most banks is also volatile, as banks package and sell loans frequently
into the growing secondary market for bank loans.'" The biggest
banks, which have been shifting their activities over the past few years
from more conventional lending into exotic securities and derivatives
trading, are even more opaque than the smaller banks. The biggest
banks are rapidly growing more dynamic, and their assets are quickly
becoming more complex."4
A substantial body of economic literature has examined the ques-
tion of bank opacity, and the results have been mixed. Some studies
have concluded that banking organizations are more opaque than
non-banking companies. Studies by economists Donald Morgan and
Richard Cantor and Frank Packer have shown that the Moody's and
Standard & Poors rating agencies have more, ratings disagreements
over bank holding companies than over other firms of comparable
size and risk. 175 Similarly, a study by Robert Avery, Terrence Belton
and Michael Goldberg showed that risk premiums on bank-related
long-term debt are virtually unrelated to traditional accounting meas-
ures of bank performance and that the risk premiums are only weakly
related to ratings conferred by private-sector rating agencies. 176 Fi-
nally, Gary Gorton and Anthony Santomero concluded that account-
ing measures of risk only marginally predict the market-determined
volatility of bank assets.'"
Although these studies have shown that banks are somewhat
opaque, many recent studies suggest that the market does exact an
Evaluate Asset Quality Exposure in Banks?, FED. RES. BANK. NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July/Aug.
1989, at 3.
17' See, e.g., MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 13.01 (2d ed. 1998);
ROBERT L. TORTORIELLO, GUIDE TO BANK UNDERWRITING, DEALING AND BROKERAGE Ac-
TIVITIES X-3 (4th ed. 2000).
174 There is some evidenCe, however, that smiler banks are more opaque to the mar-
ket. Morgan found that the probability of a ratings split between Moody's and S&P de-
creases up to some level of bank assets. See MORGAN, supra note 171, at 15. Morgan also
found, however, that the probability of a ratings split begins to increase again at some level
of assets. The probability of a ratings split increases as a bank substitutes loans and leases
for securities and as a bank moves securities into its trading account. See id. at 16.
175 See generally Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED. RES.
BANK OF N. Y. Q. REV., Summer/Fall 1994, at 1-26; MORGAN, supra note 171. Cantor and
Packer found that Moody's and S&P split over only 37% of the general sample of firms but
over 63% of the banks. See Cantor & Packer, supra at 1-26. Morgan found that, controlling
for risk and asset size, Moody's and S&P are about 12% more likely to split over banks than
over non-financial firms. See MORGAN, supra note 171, at 12.
176 SeeAvery et al., supra note 113, at 608.
177
 See Gorton & Santomero, supra note 6, at 123-27.
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institution-specific risk premium from banking organizations.'" Ju-
lapa Jagtiani, George Kaufman and Catharine Lemieux concluded
that, from 1992 to 1997, the market-priced credit risk for the debt of
banking organizations was determined by accounting risk measures,
private agency ratings and the regulatory rating of the borrower.'"
Professors Mark Flannery and Sorin Sorescu found that, between
1983 and 1991, subordinated debt yields were sensitive to bank risk
and that the sensitivity increased as the government withdrew de facto
insurance coverage from uninsured liabilities. 180 Moreover, a study by
Thomas Cargill found that, between 1981 and 1987, bank certificate
of deposit ("CD") rates reflected "CAMELS" scores, the system used
by federal banking regulators to rate the condition of banks. 181 Her-
bert Baer and Elijah Brewer also found that rates of return to holders
of uninsured CDs were correlated with changes in the banks' market-
to-asset ratios and the volatility of bank returns on equity. 182
The empirical studies indicating the existence of some bank
opacity do not amount to much of an objection to the market disci-
pline hypothesis. First, the empirical studies that have shown a weak
correlation between market-exacted risk premiums and accounting
measures of bank risk only establish that the market uses more than
accounting data to assess the riskiness of banks. Unless research can
show that accounting measures of bank risk are the best predictors of
bank failures, these studies do not prove enough. Second, the empiri-
cal studies showing that rating agencies disagree over bank securities
more often than over non-bank securities only show that banks are
somewhat more opaque than non-banks. Slight relative opacity, how-
ever, does not imply that the market is unable to evaluate the riskiness
of banks; rather, it indicates only that the market considers assessing
bank value and risk somewhat more difficult than assessing non-bank
value and risk. Banks will pay for this relative opacity and consequent
1" Market participants generally believe that prices of existing bank subordinated debt
reflect risk differentials across organizations. See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, supra note
64, at 16.
1 " See Jagtiani et al., supra note 119, at 21-22.
180 See Mark J. Flannery & Sorin Sorescu, Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordi-
nated Debenture	 1983-1991, 51 J. FIN. 1347, 1373-74 (1996).
181 See Thomas F. Cargill, CAMEL Ratings and . the CD Market, 31 FIN. SERV. RES. 347,
353-55 (1989). CAMELS stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earn-
ings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risks. See FEDERAL RESERVE COMMERCIAL BANK
EXAMINATION MANUAL 1020.1 (May 1997).
182 See Herbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market Discipline:
Some New Evidence, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO, Sept./Oct. 1986, at
23-29.
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uncertainty since bond investors will demand a premium for it. 183
Third, most of the instruments analyzed in the first set of empirical
studies discussed above were short-term, and short-term investors do
not care so much about borrower risk profile.'"
Finally, and most importantly, the empirical studies conducted to
date have suffered contamination from a bank regulatory environ-
ment that provides an implicit federal government guarantee to bank
investors. If bank debtholders believe that the federal government will
protect them from loss if their bank fails, and issuing banks under-
stand this, debtholders will be unable to exact a risk premium from
volatile banks. Although this implicit government guarantee is
thought to protect uninsured creditors of only the biggest banks, it is
precisely those banks that issue most of the debt that the empirical
studies have analyzed. While the implicit guarantee has weakened
over the past decade,'" most of the studies were performed when the
guarantee was in full effect.
One method for improving the capital markets' ability to assess
bank risk levels is to improve the quality and increase the amount of
public disclosures that banks are required to make. Banks are already
subject to a host of disclosure requirements. Publicly held banks and
their holding companies are required to make annual, quarterly and
special event reports to the SEC. 186 Banks also are required to submit
year-end consolidated reports of income and quarterly consolidated
reports of condition,'" and make special disclosures in areas of
heightened supervisory concern.'" The Basle Committee on Bank
Supervision has repeatedly issued guidance to bank supervisors relat-
185 See, e.g., BREALEY & MY ERs, supra note 70, at 179-83. To avoid paying an '`opacity
premium," banks issuing subordinated debt in our proposal will be expected to increase
the quality and quantity of their disclosure. See supra Part V.C. The current price for opac-
ity, however, is low. One study estimated that yields on investment grade bonds with split
ratings, for example, are only 6 basis points higher than the yields predicted by the average
rating of the bond. See NIORGAN, supra note 171, at 8.
nu See Macey & Garrett, supra note 80, at 233-36 (citing examples).
185 See discussion in supra note 47; see also infra Part VI.B.
186 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78;11(a) , 7811(a) 	 78n (d) (1994).
187 See 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1994) (national banks); § 324 (1094) (state member banks);
§ 1817(a) (1994) (state nonmember banks).
188 See 12 U.S.C. § 3906 (1994) (foreign loan concentration); 12 C.F.R. § 304.4 (1999)
(insider loans).
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ing to increasing the transparency of banking organizations. 189 Fed-
eral bank regulators have made similar proposals.m
Banks already have some natural incentives to disclose informa-
tion. For example, '.banks with a reputation for providing timely and
accurate information to the public can access the capital markets
more cheaply. 191 Increased public disclosure about bank assets and
operations will have the collateral benefit of reducing the potential
for systemic disruptions of the financial landscape by improving the
ability of market participants to distinguish strong banks from weak
banks in troubled times.m
B. Market Discipline Is Ineffective due to Federal Protection of Creditors
The objection: Market discipline can only be effective if market par-
ticipants do not expect the government to compensate them for
losses they may accrue in connection with their investments in banks.
Federal bank regulators historically have been reluctant to close large
failed banks and impose losses on creditors and uninsured depositors
because of a fear that such substantial failures might destabilize the
banking systern. 193
1" See, e.g.. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Bank Danspareng
(visited Feb. 22, 2000) ¢http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs41.hunt >.
190 See Ferguson, supra note 158, at 4.
191 See Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 189, at 5; see also Macey 8.:
Garrett, Market Discipline, supra note 80. at 226-27 (arguing that banks have a strong incen-
tive voluntarily to disclose relevant financial information to depositors). A recent study by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers also concluded that banks could raise their equity prices by dis-
closing more information. See Barbara A. Rehm, Fuller Disclosure Could Aid Bank Stocks, Study
Says, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2,1999, at 2.
There are also inherent limitations, however, on the amount and timeliness of public
disclosure that banks can make: the quality of a bank's risk management system may be
difficult to convey; comparing financial information across countries is a difficult task; a
bank has an obvious need to preserve the confidentiality of certain business plans and
certain information provided to it by its customers; and producing information is costly.
See Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 189, at 7-8.
192 See Basle Comm. on Banking SuperviSion, supra note 189, at 7; supra Part V.C. Even
Professor Gallen, perhaps the most prolific critic of market discipline approaches to bank
regulation, admits that banks publicly disclose sufficient information to permit market
participants to assess the riskiness of bank assets and activities. See Garten, Banking on the
Market, supra note 80, at 131,144-45. Professor Garten argues that the opacity problem
does not relate to an investor's inability to assess the probability of a bank insolvency, but
rather to the uncertain consequences to an investor of a bank insolvency. See id. at 148-50.
This aspect of the opacity problem was powerfully addressed by FDICIA. See infra Part VI.B.
193 See JAMES P. MCCOLLOM, THE CONTINENTAL AFFAIR: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS BANK (1987); JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY MILLER, BANKING
LAW AND REGULATION 629 (2d ed. 1997).
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The response: The implicit federal guarantee of the investments of
creditors and uninsured depositors of large banking organizations—
the "too-big-to-fail" doctrine—has historically placed a significant ob-
stacle in the way of effective market discipline. FDICIA, however, re-
quires the FDIC to resolve failed banks in the manner that imposes
the lowest cost on the deposit insurance fund. 194 Moreover, since
January 1, 1995, the FDIC has been forbidden to take any action "that
would have the effect of increasing losses to any insurance fluid by
protecting . . . depositors for more than the insured portion of depos-
its [or] creditors other than depositors." 195 'While these provisions of
FDICIA may theoretically restrict the scope of the too-big-to-fail doc-
trine, it is not clear how restrictive they will be in practice. 196 In order
to implement a successful market discipline approach to bank regula-
tion, the federal government must credibly commit not to insure the
losses of the relevant market participants. 197 The recent empirical
194 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (4) (1994). FDICIA preserves the federal bank regulators' abil-
ity to apply the too-big-to-fail doctrine, but only in connection with failures that would
impose excessive systemic risks OIL the banking system. The FDIC may dispense with the
least-cost rule" only if two-thirds of the directors of the FDIC and two-thirds of the gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve Board so recommend in writing, and the Secretary of the
Treasury agrees with the recommendation. See id. § I823(c) (4) (G).
199 See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (4) (E)(i) (1994). FDICIA also provides, however, that fed-
eral bank regulators may protect uninsured deposits in purchase and assumption transac-
tions that are no more expensive than liquidations. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(iii).
196 See Mantripragada, supra note 5, at 563-65 (arguing that FDICIA has not really re-
moved the too-big-to-fail doctrine). Although the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's
("FRBNY") brokering of the bail-out of Long-Term Capital Management did not involve
the use of public funds to save private creditors from losses, the FRBNY's actions indicate
that the Federal Reserve remains concerned about the systemic risks resulting from the
failure of a large financial institution. See Paul S. Nadler, Long Term Lessons from Long-Term
Capital Management, SECURED LENDER, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 14; Financial Markets: Shadow
Regulatory Panel Calls on Fed to Explain Role in Hedge Fund Bail Out, ENA RANIUNG DAILY,
Sept. 29,1998, at D2.
197 But see Garten, Mat Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at 1166-67 (arguing that fail-
ure policy should not be automatic and inflexible because the failure process is costly and
failures may create systemic adverse effects on the FDIC and healthy banks); Richard E.
Randall, The Need to Protect Depositors of Large Banks, and the Implications for Bank Powers and
Ownership, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., Sept./Oct. 1990, at 63,67-69 (arguing that removal
of the federal government's implied support of uninsured bank creditors may destabilize
the payments system and reduce the availability of short-ter ► credit in the economy).
Professor Garten argues that bank failure policy should not be designed exclusively to
focus on facilitation of market discipline of healthy banks. See Garten, What Prke Bank Fail-
ure?, supra note 7, at 1176. Rather, minimizing losses to the bank insurance funds must be
the primary goal. Garten's argument assumes that what the FDIC saves in the short-term
by managing each failure to save the bank insurance fund is not outweighed in the long-
term by the costs of bank failures caused by the decreased market discipline of investors.
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studies cited in the preceding section suggest the government has
made a reasonably credible commitment.'" We believe that federal
regulators should not take any actions that would weaken the plausi-
bility of this pledge.
C. Bank Investment Strategy Can Defeat Market Discipline
The objection: For market discipline to be successful, bank manag-
ers must alter their investment and activity strategies as a result of
market influence. Bank managers, however, are not sensitive to de-
clines in the market value of the bank's securities because their pri-
mary source of funding is deposits (mostly insured deposits). Moreo-
ver, to the extent that a bank can finance its operations by insured
deposits and internally generated cash flow, it will not need to access
the capital markets and will not pay a penalty for declining stock or
bond prices. 1"
The response: As discussed above, market participants can disci-
pline a bank in various ways.200 First, in addition to selling their in-
vestments in the bank and thereby signaling to other investors and
bank managers that the bank is behaving badly, subordinated deb-
tholders also will be able to control bank manager behavior through
negotiated covenants in the debt indenture. Second, our proposal will
require Subject Banks to access the capital markets once every two
years, notwithstanding the amount of deposits or internally generated
cash flow available to the bank. Third, banks, especially Tier I banks,
are relying less on insured deposits to fund their operations and more
on capital market instruments.201 . Fourth, even in the absence of a
This Article demonstrates that market discipline by subordinated debtholders can work
and that, therefore, these long-term costs will be high.
198 See generally Gorton & Santcmiero, supra note 6; Flannery & Sorescu, supra note 180.
Although the FRI3NY's actions in the fall of 1998 with respect to Long-Terni Capital Man-
agement evidence a continuing federal government interest in preventing the failure of
large financial firms, it is important to note that the Federal Reserve never offered to bail
out LTCM's creditors with taxpayer money.
199 See WILLIAM J. BALIMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 69-70
(1965); GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH (1984); Garten, What Price
Bank Failure?, supra note '7, at 1177-78.
"0 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
201
 As of December 31, 1998, deposits represented 67.6% Of the assets of FDIGinsured
commercial banks in the United States; as of December 31. 1991, deposits represented
78.4% of such assets. Among Tier I banks, as of December 31. 1998, deposits represented
62.9% of assets; as of December 31, 1991, deposits represented 72.5% of assets. See FDIC,
Statistics on Banking Fourth Quarter 1998, Table 105A, N21111b17; Assets and Deposits of FDIC-
Insureti Commercial Banks (visited April 4, 2000) <http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/
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need or desire to access the capital markets, bank managers will strive
to avoid falling share prices or bond prices because such falling prices
may reduce the manager's compensation, cause shareholders to re-
place managers for permitting the share prices to fall, or trigger a
takeover.2°2
D. Investors' Desires May Lead Bank Managers to Increase Risk Taking
The o&jection: Bank managers are naturally risk averse. Failure of
their bank will result in a significant diminishment of the value of
their human capital; consequently, bank managers will make conser-
vative investments' and engage only in low-risk activities. At the same
time, investors generally diversify their investment portfolios to re-
duce firm-specific risk and hence maximize the risk-adjusted rate of
return of their investments. 2" Diversified investors have a greater tol-
erance for risk than does the federal government, since losses in one
investment in the portfolio likely will be offset by gains in other in-
vestments in the portfolio. Hence, making bank managers more sensi-
tive to the desires of their investors may lead to an increase in risk tak-
ing.04
The response: As a preliminary matter, bank managers typically are
substantial equityholders or stock option holders in their employer.
As such, bank managers are not especially risk adverse.
Investors, especially debt investors,. should be expected to reduce
bank risk profiles. While there can be no doubt that investors increas-
ingly are becoming more diversified, and that diversified investors
care less about firm-specific risk than non-diversified investors, inves-
tor diversification does not pose a problem. First, and most impor-
tantly, even diversified investors care about the risk profile of their
individual investments. They care about the nature of the risks be-
cause, in constructing investment portfolios, investors need to know
statistics/9812/cbstru.html›; FDIC, Statistics on Banking Fourth Quarter 1991, Table 105A,
Number, Assets and Deposits of FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks (visited April 4, 2000) <http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/9112/cbstru.html >.
202 But see Van Der Weide, supra note 67, at 69-71 (arguing that despite constraints
managers still have room to engage in self-dealing and not decrease risk-taking activities).
Because banks are %many wholly owned by a holding company and bank shares are typi-
cally not publicly traded, bank managers will act to protect the interests of bank holding
company shareholders. Bank managers are often also managers at the holding company
level. Moreover, in most cases dangerous activity at the bank level will be reflected by a
decline in the share price of the parent bank holding company.
20' See BREALEY & Mvzas, supra note 70, at 148-66.
2" See Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at 1179.
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the amount of negatiVe correlation between packages of invest-
ments"5; they care about the quantity of risks because eliminating
losses on any investment maximizes the value of the entire portfolio.
Second, many investors are not diversified; the non-diversified inves-
tors, as well as the diversified investors with a large percentage of their
portfolio invested in the subordinated debt of one issuer, will provide
appropriate risk monitoring. Third, debt investors are different from
stockholders. Because their upside gains are limited, debt investors
have a direct risk aversion for each company in which they invest, de-
spite diversification. Even diversified debtholders make efforts to en-
sure that their portfolio companies limit their risks.
E. Subordinated Debtholders Support Risky Activity when Facing Insolvency
The objection: Holders of heavily subordinated debt (like the deb-
tholders in our proposal) will have equity-like risk preferences, espe-
cially as a bank approaches insolvency and the value of the bank's eq-
uity approaches zero.206
The response: Admittedly, subordinated debtholders will prefer
riskier bank activities and projects as a bank approaches insolvency.
For two reasons, however, this fact does not threaten the viability of
the proposal presented in this Article. First, as discussed above, sub-
ordinated debtholders are appropriately risk averse in contexts prior
to impending insolvency,207
 and most of the decisions that impel
banks into insolvency are taken prior to the appearance of insolvency
on the horizon. Moreover, even in the face of an impending insol-
vency, subordinated debtholders are more risk averse than equity-
holders: equityholders will enjoy all of the benefits of the success of a
risky project, but debtholders will enjoy benefits only up to the return
of their principal and accrued interest. Debtholders also are more
likely than equityholders to receive their invested principal back in an
insolvency proceeding.
F. The Short-Term Perspective of Market Participants Creates Risks
The objection: Capital markets investors are fickle and too short-
term oriented for the good of banks. 208
2°5 See BREALEY & MYERS, Supra note 70, at 148-56.
2°0 See Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7. at 1180; Gallen, Market Discipline
Revisited, supra note 43, at 201.
"7 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
208 See Gallen, Market Discipline Revisited, supra note 43, at 204.
258	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:195
The response: While this argument with respect to shareholders is
off the mark,209
 it is true that subordinated debtholders under our
proposal will have their principal returned as soon as six years after
the initial investment. While six years is something less than an eter-
nity (the time horizon of bank regulators), it is a substantial period of
time. The slippage resulting from the difference in time horizons
should be more than offset by the gains accruing to the banking sys-
tem from increasing the amount of bank monitoring by sophisticated
fixed claimants and forcing banks to go into the capital markets every
two years.
G. Investors Will Not Assume the Role of Monitoring Banks
The objection: Holders of securities of a bank with an escalating
risk profile, especially holders of debt securities whose disciplining
tools are crude and generally negative in nature, will find it cheaper
to sell the securities and sever their connection to the bank than to
maintain their investment and attempt to alter the bank's behavior. 21°
The response: This may be true with respect to holders of subordi-
nated debt securities in Tier I banks. These debt securities will be
bought and sold in a liquid, public market. For most of these inves-
tors, the cheapest method of expressing their thoughts about the
prospects of a bank may be to sell the debt. Such selling pressure,
however, will reduce the market price of the bank's debt and signal to
the market, to bank management and to bank regulators that the
market frowns upon the bank's increasing risk profile. Because our
proposal requires banks to enter the debt capital markets every two
years, such selling pressure and the resultant declining market price
also will increase the future cost of funding to the bank.
Holders of subordinated debt in Tier II banks, however, may not
enjoy a liquid market in which to sell their securities. Moreover, the
federal securities laws will prevent them from selling any privately is-
sued debt for several years.rn For these investors, it is unlikely that
exit will be seen as a primary investment management strategy.
"9 See Van Der Weide, supra note 67, at 61-62.
210 See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 322-23. On the exit/voice dichotomy, see generally Ale
BERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate itionitor, 91 Count. L. REV, 1277 (1991).
211 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999).
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H. Collective Action Pn9blems Will Prevent Market Discipline
The objection: Monitoring by market participants is costly. Holders
of bank securities will be too diffuse to exercise control over the bank;
collective action problems will prevent market participants from pro-
viding effective discipline over bank behavior. 212
The response: To the extent that a set of market participants de-
termines that collective action problems—such as high information
costs and free riders—pose a threat to the quality of their investments,
nothing would prevent them from appointing one of their own as a
compensated monitoring agent. Institutional investors routinely ap-
point an indenture trustee to represent their interests with respect to
a bond issuance 213 Bank lenders also routinely appoint an agent bank
to represent their interests with respect to syndicated loans. 214 In addi-
tion, to the extent that market participants believe that their invest-
ments will suffer because collective action problems will interfere with
their monitoring ability, market participants will pass along those costs
to borrower banks. As a consequence, banks will likely assist market
participants in establishing some sort of agent to represent their in-
terests.215 Moreover, disciplining through direct monitoring is only
one method of disciplining. The requirement that a bank return to
the capital markets periodically and the ability of market participants
to withdraw their investment and reduce the share or bond price of
the bank are also effective mechanisms. No collective action problem
will interfere with these disciplinary mechanisms.
Holders of subordinated debt, who can make intelligent invest-
ment decisions ex ante, can solve the collective action problem related
to ex post monitoring by investing in firms that must continually return
to the capital markets. A bank under our proposal will not attempt to
increase its riskiness at current debtholders' expense because it knows
it will have to return to the market to issue additional debt in the near
future.
I. Market Participants Will Not Be Able to Affect Bank Behavior
The objection: Market discipline will not be effective because mar-
ket participants are unable to take actions to align a bank's incentives
212 See Gouvin, supra note 5, at 323: Garter, Market Discipline Revisited, supra note 43, at
208.
213 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 70, at 684.
214
 See, e.g., GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 92, at 131-207.
215 See also Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline, supra note 80, at 232.
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with their own. Bondholders are unable to constrain company behav-
ior through their contractual covenants. 216 The typical covenants ne-
gotiated by debtholders (asset maintenance and prohibitions on in-
curring senior debt) are unduly restrictive for a bank and would be
ineffective in controlling bank risk. 217
 Banks, because of the very na-
ture of the business of banking, would insist on preserving their
flexibility to substitute assets without substantial restriction. Banks can
increase their risk profile very easily by substituting assets.
The response: Admittedly, bank debtholders would probably not
negotiate strict asset sale prohibitions or strict prohibitions on the in-
currence of senior debt. Instead, they would , likely negotiate mini-
mum financial ratios, activity restrictions, and limits on the bank's
ability to incur additional senior debt. Bank debtholders would likely
insist on a covenant that prevents the bank from entering "critically
undercapitalized" status, since FDICIA prevents such banks from mak-
ing any payments on their subordinated debt.ns Furthermore, bank
regulators will be able to learn a great deal about preventing the in-
solvency of financial institutions by observing the kinds of covenants
that bank debtholders employ in their bond indentures and reviewing
over time the efficacy of the various covenants in controlling bank
risk.
Public stockholders and bondholders also can punish bad bank
behavior by selling their shares or their debt securities. This selling
pressure will lower the price of the bank's stock or debt, as the case
may be, and will signal to the market that bank managers are taking
actions inconsistent with the best interests of bank shareholders or
debtholders. Bank managers will have trouble retaining their jobs as
the value of the bank's public securities falls. Moreover, if the bank
must raise funds in the capital markets on a consistent basis, it will
find that excessively risky behavior and the resultant drop in securities
prices will make such financing substantially more expensive.
215
 See Garten, 11710 Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at 1181-83. Although Garten sup-
ports her argument by pointing out that deposit contracts rarely include such covenants,
the position of depositors with respect to a bank is very different front a debtholder: de-
posits are liquid, short-term investments; depositors are covered by insurance; and deposi-
tors generally are not investing enough to make negotiating for covenants worthwhile.
217 See Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, supra note 7, at 1183.
218 Sce 12 U.S.C. §§ 18310(10(1) & 1831o(h) (2) (1994),
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J. Subordinated Debt Is an Unattractive Form of Financing
The objection: Banks find raising debt and equity in the capital
markets to be very expensive. Banks do not issue much subordinated
debt today because it would be an expensive form of financing and
because there is not sufficient market appetite for the subordinated
debt of banks.21° Moreover, the market for existing bank subordinated
debt is a dealer market220; regulators will have a difficult time acquir-
ing reliable price information on the debt.
The response: The market for the subordinated debt of banking
organizations with greater than $50 billion in assets is actually highly
liquid.221 The institutional investors that dominate the demand side of
the market and the bank subordinated debt dealers agree that the
secondary market prices for these securities are very efficient. Al-
though some market participants have admitted that publicly avail-
able bank debt prices are hard to locate, expectations are that such
price information will become more public in the near future. 222
A handful of Web sites have recently sprung up to provide bond
price information on a wide variety of municipal and corporate debt
issues.223 Moreover, dozens of new Internet companies are scrambling
to establish on-line bond exchanges. While their efforts have not dis-
placed the bond trading desks of the established investment banks,
which make sizable commissions from bond trading, the SEC has
made it a priority to illuminate debt security prices. 224 The liquid
market for large banking organization debt securities should only
grow more transparent in the coining years.
Admittedly, the market for smaller bank subordinated debt is
currently thin. A significant cause of the lack of volume in this mar-
ket, however, is the Capital Guidelines adopted by the bank regulatory
agencies. Banks do not issue much subordinated debt because such
debt does not count as tier 1 capital and does not fully count as tier 2
capital under the Capital Guidelines. 225 Our proposal would simply
219 See Gallen, Mcultet Discipline Revisited, supra note 43, at 200-01.
22° See USING SUBORDINATED DEBT, SUPTa note 64, at 44.
221
 See id. at 25.
222
 See id. at 49.
221 Two examples of these new Web sites, in•estinginbonds.com  and tradebonds.com ,
can be used to find information on bond prices.
224 See, e.g., Jeanne Dugan, Bond Giants Battle Upstarts in Rush to Internet, WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 2000, at Al; Jonathan Fuerbringer, Market Place. The Bondmarket Refuge of the Instinc-
tually Stodgy is Being IVired for E-Commerce Dealing, N.Y. TtstEs. Jan. 13, 2000, at CI; Gregory
Zuckerman, Bond Auction Goes Online, Then Off-Line, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 16, 1999, at C10.
225 See supra text and accompanying notes 109-114.
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counteract this regulatOry obstacle. Some banks may also resist issuing
nondeposit debt because they do not want to be bound by the cove-
nants a nondeposit creditor would impose. It is precisely these sorts of
covenants that can impose additional discipline on a bank. •
K. Investors Will'"Run" in Adversity
The objection: Market discipline will have perverse systemic ef-
fects—the relevant private investors will exit a bank quickly as adver-
sity approaches, hastening a depletion of the bank's capital and accel-
erating the bank's approaching insolvency.226
The response: Exit by subordinated debtholders can only be ac-
complished through sale of the securities to another purchaser. The
debt instrument proposed in this Article is not puttable. The debt se-
curities will remain outstanding until maturity, at least six years after
issuance. Hence, exit by subordinated debtholders does not create the
type of systemic risk of a run on the bank that exit by depositors cre-
ates. While our proposal does permit one-third of the subordinated
debt capital to leave the bank every two years, this sort of a staggered
long-term departure of capital should not pose anything like the sys-
temic threat of a deposit run. Indeed, the inability of a bank to roll
over the required amount of subordinated debt would provide a valu-
able signal to regulators that the bank needs attention.
Admittedly, however, there is some risk that the price and other
signals transmitted by subordinated debtholders will serve not only as
risk indicators for bank regulators but also as a signal to bank deposi-
tors and other creditors. Those depositors—especially large, unin-
sured depositors—may then "run" when subordinated debtholders
indicate concerns about the risk profile of a particular institution. Al-
though the likelihood of such runs cannot be completely dismissed,
we think that the risk of uninsured depositor runs precipitated by
subordinated debt signals will not be severe. As noted in Part III.B.
above, many uninsured depositors are not sophisticated investors, and
they will not pay careful attention to the informational conveyances of
subordinated debtholders. Accordingly, we expect that federal regula-
tors will react with greater alacrity to subordinated debt signals than
depositors and that regulators (and subordinated debtholders) will
take measures to counteract risky bank activities before the situation
becomes so severe as to cause a fatal depositor run.
226 See Garters, Banking on the Market, supra note 80, at 153-56, 162.
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L. Federal Macroeconomic Policy Could Be Inhibited by Market Discipline
The objection: Market discipline may interfere with a bank's ca-
pacity to assist federal regulators in implementing macroeconomic
policy.227 Federal exhortations to lend or provide liquidity to the
economy may run counter to the interests of debtholders.
The response: The Federal Reserve's most powerful weapons for
implementing macroeconomic policies—buying and selling govern-
ment securities, altering reserve requirements for banks, and chang-
ing the discount and federal funds borrowing rates 229—will not be af-
fected by the existence of additional subordinated debt in the capital
structure of banks; these methods merely make quantitative adjust-
ments to the interest rate environment in which banks operate. When
the Federal Reserve and other federal regulators attempt to effect
macroeconomic policies through More informal means (for example,
urging banks to raise or lower their underwriting criteria), a bank's
profit motives may run counter to the federal regulatory nudge. This
conflict of interest between banks and regulators is not made worse,
however, by the presence of subordinated debt investors. Indeed,
where the informal nudge from regulators is a recommendation of
stricter loan underwriting standards, 229 debtholders will be more
likely to support this goal than the equityholders whom such deb-
tholders partially replace in this proposal. •
CONCLUSION
Requiring large banks to issue subordinated debt promises to
remedy many of the shortcomings of government supervision and
regulation. Actual and prospective' holders of bank subordinated debt
will constrain bank risk taking roughly in accordance with the wishes
of the federal government and without the bureaucratic and other
inefficiencies entailed in governmental regulation. Holders of bank
subordinated debt, as they buy and sell bank debt securities in the
secondary market and negotiate pUrchases in the primary market, will
also signal to federal regulators the private sector's view as to the value
of a bank's enterprise. While such a market discipline approach
227 See Gallen, Whatever Happened, supra note 17, at 782-83.
228 See PURPOSES SG FUNCTIONS, supra note 33, at 5.
228 See Katharine Fraser, Fed Mandates Tough Stance on Lax Lending, Am. BANKER, Sept.
29, 1999, at 1; Rob Garver, OCC Says Big Coinmercial Loans Suffering from Lax Underwriting,
Aim. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1999, at 1; James Toedintan, Greenspan Remarks Trigger Jitters, NEWS-
DAY, Oct. 16, 1999, at A7.
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should not supplant government regulation, supervision and exami-
nation of banks, it cari and should serve as an effective complement
to government oversight of financial institutions.
